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ABSTRACT 
 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE  
ON SAFEGUARD MEASURES UNDER THE WTO 
 
BY 
 
CHENG HU 
 
The safeguard measure under GATT Article XIX and WTO Safeguard Agreement is an 
extraordinary trade remedy under emergent situations against fair trade practice. The 
ultimate objective of safeguard is to gradually broaden trade liberalization. Meanwhile, it 
is designed to facilitate structural adjustment of domestic industry and to balance the 
domestic political powers.  
Safeguard was not an instrument of choice during the GATT period, in that it should be 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis and requires compensation. The text of “escape 
clause” (GATT Article XIX) was fairly ambiguous and difficult to apply. The 
overwhelming use of various export restraint agreements and antidumping measures 
paled the significance of safeguard mechanism under the multilateral trade regime. 
The Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement is a great improvement on GATT Article XIX, 
with strict procedural requirements, clarified substantive standards, a compromise on the 
issue of selectivity, and prohibition of “grey area measures”. It has been applied by an 
increasing frequency since the WTO came into being. However, it also embodies many 
unclear concepts and criteria. Several disputes were filed before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
This paper focuses on the procedural and substantive issues extensively discussed during 
the panel and Appellate Body proceeding, such as terms of reference, standard of review, 
applicability of GATT Article XIX and XIII in the context of Safeguard Agreement, 
unforeseen developments, increased imports, domestic industry, serious injury and threat 
thereof, causal link and non-attribution, necessary extent of application, notification and 
consultation, and so forth. Four remaining issues in the dispute settlement are also 
discussed in the paper. They are the GATT XXIV defense to the non-discrimination 
application of safeguard measures, structural adjustment, procedural defect of the dispute 
settlement regarding safeguard and the contradictory rulings on disputed issues. In 
general, the panel and Appellate Body made clear many equivocal issues. Nevertheless, 
some issues remain unclear and some new issues arose. 
Special concern is drawn on the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism 
embodied in the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China. Some legal 
problems exist in the Protocol, which definitely will bring about new challenges before 
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the DSB. There, the author calls for prudential and objective scrutiny of legal implication 
of the Protocol and Members’ actions by the panel and Appellate Body. 
Finally, through the case study, the author makes some suggestions for the improvement 
of the current safeguard Mechanism. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Broadly defined, the term “safeguard protection” refers to a provision in an 
agreement permitting governments under specified circumstances to withdraw – or cease 
to apply – their normal obligations in order to protect (safeguard) certain overriding 
interests.1 As a matter of fact, all the international trade agreements embody safeguard 
provision and exceptions. 
The safeguard protection under GATT and WTO can be divided into two categories: 
permanent exceptions and temporary exceptions.2 The former refers to general exceptions 
stated in GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV and renegotiation or modification of 
schedules allowed by GATT Article XXVIII and GATS Article XXI. Temporary 
safeguard measures are applicable under predefined conditions for temporary import 
barriers. Except for the most significant safeguard under GATT Article XIX and the 
Safeguard Agreement, there are several other mechanisms that also fall under the general 
rule of safeguard, namely, antidumping measures under GATT Article VI, countervailing 
measures under GATT Article XVI, trade restrictions due to balance of payment 
problems under GATT Article XII and XVIII, infant industry protection under GATT 
Article XVIII.   
What I will talk about in this paper is the safeguard protection embodied in GATT 
Article XIX and Safeguard Agreement, which provides for temporary protection to 
relevant domestic producers against increased imports that are causing or threatening to 
cause serious injury to the like or directly competitive domestic industry. The import  
1. Bernard M. Hoekman, and Michelm. M. Koestecki, The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p.303. 
2. Ibid. 
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restraint can take the form of increased tariff, quantitative restrictions or other measures. 
It is the application of rebus sic stantibus in the field of international economic relations. 
Since the WTO came into existence, safeguard measure, as the one of the main trade 
remedies under the multilateral trading system, has been invoked by an increasing 
frequency by WTO Members for protective objectives. 
In the following chapter, I will first discuss the rationales for safeguards, followed 
by historical origin of safeguard and its subsequent development under GATT and the 
WTO. Then, I will move to the cases filed before Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and 
the dispute settlement practice. In particular, I will concentrate on several critical 
procedural and substantive issues as well as remaining problems arising in dispute. In 
analysis, I will focus on the approach the panels and Appellate Body used to address the 
issues and the legal interpretation of the Safeguard Agreement, while not the factual 
aspects of the case. Some concerns on the challenges before the DSB brought by the 
transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism towards China will be discussed 
afterwards. To conclude, I will give some suggestions on the further improvement of the 
Safeguard Agreement.  
 
II. The Rationales for Safeguard 
 
Unlike antidumping and countervailing measures that deal with unfair or improper 
trade practice, safeguard provided by GATT Article XIX (See Appendix 1) and 
Safeguard Agreement (See Appendix 2) is targeted at exporting country’s fair trade 
practice. Evidently, safeguard is incongruous with principle of trade liberalization, which 
is the fundamental goal of GATT and WTO. The increase of fairly traded imports and the 
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loss to the domestic import competing industry result from the operation of the economic 
law of comparative advantage and are thereby economically efficient. What’s more, in 
economic principal, import protection leads to deadweight loss born by domestic 
consumers. Then, how can a member country despise the market principal? Why should 
GATT and WTO bow to member country’s deviations from its commitments? The 
following four arguments may support the existence of safeguard: the restoration of 
competitiveness argument; the orderly contraction argument; the political safety valve 
argument; and the public choice theory argument.3  
Firstly, safeguard measures give a domestic industry injured by imports time to 
adjust to liberalized trade environment. By given certain “buffer period” for adjustment, 
the ailing domestic producers are expected to gain profits and become efficient enough to 
compete with foreign exporters in the free market after protection is removed. However, 
which industry to be protected and whether the protected industry can restore 
competitiveness are questionable.  
Secondly, temporary safeguard help to the contraction of those industries that do 
not have the potential to regain profits. It relieves the resources from those industries to 
more potential and competitive industries, and then realizes structural adjustment. During 
the process, safeguard measure allows the importing countries to transfer some of the 
adjustment cost from itself to exporting countries, on the one hand, from domestic import 
competing producers to domestic consumers, on the other hand. 
The third argument may be the most well known support for safeguard. In practice, 
safeguard is a “safety valve” for protectionist. It provides governments with the means to 
3. Bhala, Raj, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., New York: 
Lexis Publishing, 2000, p. 1118. 
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renege on the specific liberalization commitments under certain circumstances, thus 
diminishes the pressures for a more drastic departure from the general principal and 
increases long-term stability of the multilateral system. Practically, safeguard serves the 
key function of regulating a trade-off between trade liberalization ex ante and 
opportunities to impose protection ex post.4  
The final argument relates to public choice theory. The theory holds that politicians 
tend to focus on the concerns of producers adversely affected by trade liberalization 
rather than consumers beneficially affected by it. The cost of liberalization and the 
benefits of protection are narrowly concentrated on the small group of producers. 
Whereas, benefits of liberalization and costs of protection are broadly diffused on the 
individual consumers. In result, producer group is well organized and therefore politically 
powerful. The temporary revocable commitments help to mitigate the pressure for 
protection from the producer group and give the governments more opportunities to 
concern about the overall social welfare. And the member countries will be more likely to 
agree to greater liberalization. 
 
III. Historical Origin and Subsequent Development 
 
Safeguard measure pursuant to GATT Article XIX (known as “escape clause”) can 
find its origin in 1943 Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the USA and Mexico.5 
When the text of GATT and ITO was under negotiation in 1947, US executive issued an 
order requiring the inclusion of escape clause in all trade agreement entered into by the 
USA. 
4. Ibid. p. 1122 
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The safeguard mechanism of the modern international trading system was first 
introduced into the GATT in 1947 as Article XIX, titled “Emergency Action on Imports 
of Particular Products”. The language of Article XIX is quite similar to the escape clause 
in the 1943 Reciprocal Trade Agreement.6 The prerequisite for the invocation of Article 
XIX under the GATT 1947 were (a) result of unforeseen developments and GATT 
obligation, (b) the existence of increased imports, (c) serious injury or threat thereof, and 
(d) causal link between (b) and (c). Though Article XIX gave certain criteria for 
invocation of safeguard measures, those critical legal concepts, like “unforeseen 
developments”, “serious injury and threat thereof” and “like or directly competitive 
products”, remain unclear. Therefore, the GATT language of Article XIX as to these 
variable concepts, as well as to the various criteria, is quite ambiguous, resulting in the 
difficulty in interpretation and uncertainty in application. In addition, the lack of specific 
procedural requirements and no provision for the time limits of safeguard measures add 
to the systemic uncertainties.  
5. The original wording is “If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the 
concession granted on any article enumerated and described in the Schedules 
annexed to this Agreement, such article is being imported in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to 
domestic producers of like or similar articles, the Government of either country shall 
be free to withdraw the concession, in whole or in part, or to modify it to the extent 
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.” See US House of 
Representative, Committee on Ways and Means, 1945, Hearings on the Extension of 
the Reciprocal Trade Act before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 79th 
Committee, 1st Session, pp. 277, 280. 
6. The Article XIX language reads as follows: “If, as a result of unforeseen 
developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party 
under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported 
into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that 
territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, 
in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in par or to 
withdraw or modify the concession”.  
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Due to these inherent defects, safeguard under Article XIX has not been the 
instrument of choice throughout the GATT era. Only 150 safeguard actions were notified 
to the GATT secretariat under Article XIX during the 1950-1994 period.7 Over 80% of 
those measures were adopted by developed countries, like EC, Australia, US, Canada. 
Safeguard was therefore used relatively infrequently, especially when compared to 1148 
investigations of antidumping and 187 actions of countervailing during 1985-1992 period. 
Since 1970s, ERAs (export restraint agreements, also known as “grey area measures”) 8 
have become increasingly common type of safeguard actions as the alternatives to Article 
XIX. It was estimated that in the early 1980s, ERAs covered some 10 percent of world 
trade, and that the trade weighted average tariff equivalent of the ERAs was about 15 
percent. 9 It has been the subject of criticism from Members and economists as well. One 
of the problems is their “lack of transparency”. ERAs are often arranged and kept in 
secret. Another problem is their lack of discipline that they are out of the scrutiny or 
checks of concrete domestic and international proceedings. Besides, the legal status of 
such arrangements is questionable.10 Obviously, ERAs are inconsistent with GATT 
obligations in nature and thus undermine the stability of the multilateral trading system 
and its objective of liberalization. Then, why do the GATT contracting parties prefer 
ERAs to Article XIX? Firstly, the conditions for invoking Article XIX are rather stringent. 
In particular, the non-discrimination and compensation requirement further raise the  
7. GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Volume 1, Updated 6th 
ed., 1995, p. 539-559. 
8. A variety of terms have been used for these export restraint agreements, including 
orderly marketing agreement (OMA), voluntary export restraint (VER), and 
voluntary restraint agreement (VRA). 
9. Kostecki, M., “Export Restraint Agreements and Trade Liberalization, World 
Economy, 10: 425-53, 1987. 
10. John, H. Jackson, The world Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic relations, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, p. 203-204 
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threshold of application. Secondly, the vagueness of the terms and criteria in Article XIX 
adds to the difficulties of application. Lastly, importing countries can target its 
restrictions at specific exporting countries while the exporting countries can reap 
substantial monopoly rents through the process. Therefore, both parties are reluctant to 
bring the cases before GATT and WTO Panel. In short, through the GATT era, Article 
XIX has not been a dead letter, but its use pales in comparison to other import relief 
actions. 11 
With these inherent defects in presence, GATT contracting parties, inter alia, 
safeguard target countries, made extended efforts to reform the safeguard system to 
discipline the ERAs and other import relief measures, like antidumping, on the one hand; 
and to reduce the disincentives to use Article XIX, on the other hand. Nevertheless, the 
objective to develop a new “safeguard code” finally ended in failure in Tokyo Round. 
Scene was different in Uruguay Round. The conclusion of Safeguard Agreement 
was a substantial achievement, with strict procedural requirements, clarified substantive 
standards, a compromise on the issue of selectivity, and prohibition of grey area measures.  
Firstly, the Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement sets forth specific procedural 
rules and the requirements of transparency, especially the requirements of investigation 
and the obligation of notification and consultation. 
Secondly, the Agreement gives much more explicit definition on some ambiguous 
concepts in GATT Article XIX, such as “serious injury”, “threat of serious injury”, 
“domestic industry”, and so forth.  
Thirdly, the Agreement reiterates the MFN principal of application of safeguard 
11. Supra note 3, p.1123 
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measures. However, the Agreement does allow non-MFN application under some special 
circumstances.  
Fourthly, the Agreement prohibits the use of grey area measures and requires the 
phasing out of those existing measures in certain period. 
Fifthly, the Agreement establishes the specific time limits for safeguard measures 
and requires degressive application. 
Lastly, the Agreement relaxes somewhat the compensation requirements under 
Article XIX, “provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an 
absolute increase in imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions of this 
Agreement”. 
Overall, the Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement establishes more clarified 
rights and obligations on the imposition of safeguard measures. Nevertheless, many 
issues remain unclear and cause disputes between members. Those issues will be 
discussed later. 
Since then, the use of safeguards has been expanded substantially compared to pre-
Uruguay Round period. Developing countries have become the major user of safeguards. 
To date, there have been 101 safeguard investigations initiated and notified to the WTO, 
40 definitive safeguard measures imposed and notified. Out of them, 65 safeguard 
investigations were imposed by developing countries, accounting for over 64% of total; 
27 safeguards were applied by developing countries, accounting for 67.5% of total. Major 
safeguard users now include India, Chile, Jordan, Bulgaria, Venezuela and Argentina as 
developing countries, in addition to US, Czech as developed countries. (See Table 1) 
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Table 1: Notifications of Initiations and Application of Safeguard Measures from WTO 
Members  
(Since 1 January 1995 to 28 October 2002) 
 
Member 
Safeguard 
Investigations 
Initiated 
Member 
Definitive 
Safeguard 
Measures Imposed 
    
OECD countries 36 OECD countries 13 
United States 10 United States 6 
Czech Republic 9 Czech Republic 3 
Korea 4 Korea 2 
Poland 4 EC 1 
Slovak Republic 3 Slovak Republic 1 
Australia 1   
Canada 1   
EC 1   
Hungary 1   
Japan 1   
Mexico 1   
    
Developing countries 65 Developing countries 27 
India 14 India 7 
Chile 9 Chile 5 
Jordan 8 Argentina 3 
Bulgaria 5 Egypt 3 
Venezuela 5 Brazil 2 
Argentina 4 Jordan 2 
Egypt 3 Ecuador 1 
El Salvador 3 Latvia 1 
Brazil 2 Lithuania 1 
Ecuador 2 Morocco 1 
Latvia 2 Philippines 1 
Morocco 2   
Philippines 2   
Colombia 1   
Costa Rica 1   
People's Republic of 
China 1 
  
Slovenia 1   
    
Total 101 Total 40 
Source: WTO, Safeguard Committee Annual Report 2000, G/L/409; 2001, G/L/494; 2002, 
G/L/583 
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IV. Safeguard Cases Filed under the DSU to Date 
 
During the GATT period, three cases were filed to the GATT. They are Norway 
safeguard on certain textile products, US safeguard on dried figs, US safeguard on 
hatter’s fur. 
Amongst the 63 cases addressed by DSB since the WTO came into being in 1 
January 1995, 7 cases concerned the application of safeguard measures taken under 
Safeguard Agreement.12 (See Table 2). 3 of them were complained by EC. 3 were 
targeted at US. 5 cases concern agricultural products, while 1 concerns steel products and 
1 concerns footwear. 6 cases were appealed before the Appellate Body and the other one 
has been addressed by the Panel recently.13 The proceedings resulted in the fact that none 
of the disputed safeguard measures was consistent with the relevant WTO rules. The 
most frequently disputed issues are “serious injury and threat thereof” (Article 2 and 4 of 
Safeguard Agreement), “causation and non-attribution” (Article 2, 4.2 of Safeguard 
Agreement), “unforeseen developments” (GATT Article XIX 1(a)) and “selectivity” 
(Article 2.2 of Safeguard Agreement). (See Table 3) 
 
Table 2: Completed Disputes before DSB regarding Safeguard 
 Dispute Number Complainant Defendant Subject Products Remark 
1 WT/DS/9814 EC Korea Dairy  
2 WT/DS/12115 EC Argentina Footwear  
3 WT/DS/16616 EC US Wheat Gluten  
4 WT/DS/177, 17817 New Zealand, Australia US Lamb Meat  
5 WT/DS/20218 Korea US Line Pipe  
6 WT/DS/20719 Argentina Chile Agriculture Products  
7 WT/DS/23820 Chile Argentina Preserved Peaches Panel proceeding just finished 
Source: WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/9, 29 October 
2002 
 
 - 17 - 
Apart from these 7 cases, there are 6 cases under consultation pursuant to Article 
4 of DSU. Another 3 cases is under the DSB Panel proceeding. (See Table 4) 1 led to a 
mutually agreed solution as a result of consultation between parties in the first stage of 
the dispute settlement procedures. 1 was replaced by a new dispute on the same matter. 
(See Table 5) 
Out of 16 completed or pending cases, 5 are initiated by EC, followed by 
Argentina and Colombia, who initiated 2 cases respectively. In contrast, US is the most 
frequently target country in the dispute, acting as defendant in 6 cases. Chile is the 
second frequently target countries, involved in 4 cases as defendant. Argentina was 
challenged in 3 cases. One half of these cases involved South American developing 
countries, either as complainant or as defendant. In terms of subject products, 9 safeguard 
measures in dispute concerned agricultural products, 6 of which were complained by 
12. WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/9, 29 October 2002. 
13. After the adoption of Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the US-Line Pipe case, 
Korea resorted to arbitration under DSU Article 21.3© for the determination of 
“reasonable period of time” of implementation. On July 24, 2002, the parties reached 
agreement on the matter at issue. 
14. WTO documents WT/DS/98/R, Panel Report of Korea Definitive Safeguard Measure 
on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 21 June 1999; WT/DS98/AB/R, Appellate 
Body Report, 14 December 1999. 
15. WTO documents WT/DS/121/R, Panel Report of Argentina – Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Footwear, 25 June 1999; WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 
14 December 1999. 
16. WTO documents WT/DS/166/R, Panel Report of US-Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, 31 July 2000; 
WT/DS166/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 22 December 2000. 
17. WTO documents WT/DS/177,178/R, Panel Report of US-Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 21 
December 2000; WT/DS177, 178/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 16 May 2001.  
18. WTO documents WT/DS/202/R, Panel Report of US-Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, 29 October 
2001; WT/DS/202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 8 March 2002. 
19. WTO documents WT/DS/207/R, Panel Report of Chile-Price Band System and 
Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 3 May 2002; 
WT/DS/207/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 23 October 2002. 
20. WTO documents WT/DS/238/R, Panel Report of Argentina – Definitive Safeguard 
Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches, 14 February 2003. 
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Table 3: Issues in the Dispute Settlement of Safeguard Measures 
 
Argentina-
Footwear Korea-Dairy 
US-Wheat 
Gluten 
US-Lamb 
Meat 
US-Line 
Pipe 
Chile-
Agriculture 
Products 
Argentina-
Peaches Issues 
Relevant 
Articles 
Panel AB Panel AB Panel AB Panel AB Panel AB Panel AB Panel 
Frequency 
of 
Invocation 
Procedural issues:                
     Term of Reference DSU Art.6.2, 7 ? ? ? ?   ?  ?  ? ?  8 
     Standard of Review DSU Art.11 ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?      7 
     Evidentiary Scope  
     of Review 
DSU Art.11    ? ?    ?  ?   4 
Substantive issues:                
     Serious Injury  
     & Threat Thereof 
SA Art. 2.1, 4.1, 
4.2 
? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 11 
     Causation & Non-attribution SA Art.2.1, 4.2 ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   10 
     Unforeseen Developments  GATT Art. XIX 1 ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?  ?  ? 9 
     Notification & Consultation SA Art.8, 12 ?  ? ? ? ?   ? ?    7 
     Selectivity SA Art.2.2 ? ?   ? ?   ? ?    6 
     FTA & Customs Union 
SA Art.2.2 
GATT Art. XXIV 
? ?   ? ?   ? ?    6 
     Increased Imports SA Art.2.1, 4.2(a) ? ?   ?    ?  ?  ? 6 
     Necessary Extent  
     of Application 
SA Art.5.1   ? ?     ? ? ?   5 
     Domestic Industry  SA Art. 4.1(c)       ? ?      2 
     Applicability of  
     GATT Article XIII 
GATT Art. XIII 
SA Art. 5 
        ?     1 
 
Note: The issue of “Evidentiary Scope of Review” is incorporated into the issue of “Standard of Review” in discussion.
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Table 4: Pending Disputes before DSB regarding Safeguard 
 
 Dispute Number Complainant Defendant Subject Products 
Pending 
Proceeding 
1 WT/DS78 Colombia US Broom corn brooms Consultation 
2 WT/DS123 Indonesia Argentina Footwear Consultation 
3 WT/DS159 Czech Hungary Steel products from 
Czech 
Consultation 
4 WT/DS220 Guatemala Chile Certain agricultural 
products 
Consultation 
5 WT/DS226 Argentina Chile Mixtures of edible oils Consultation 
6 WT/DS230 Colombia Chile Sugar Consultation 
7 WT/DS214 EC US Wire rod and line pipe Panel 
8 
WT/DS 
248 - 249, 
251-254, 258 
EC, Japan, 
Korea, China, 
Switzerland, 
Norway, New 
Zealand, 
Brazil 
US Certain steel products Panel 
9 WT/DS260 US EC Certain steel products Panel 
Source: WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/9, 29 October 
2002 
 
Table 5: Other Disputes before DSB regarding Safeguard 
 
 Dispute Number Complainant Defendant 
Subject 
Products Result 
1 WT/DS235 Poland Slovakia Sugar Mutually agreed solution 
2 WT/DS228 Colombia Chile Sugar Replaced by WT/DS 230 in dispute 
Source: WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/9, 29 October 
2002 
 
developing countries and 4 were targeted at developed countries. It shows the 
significance of the agricultural sector both in developed and developing countries. In 
addition to agricultural products, declining steel industry in developed countries is also 
heavily involved in dispute. All the 5 cases concerning steel products are against 
developed countries, inter alia, 3 against US.  
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Compared with the fact that only 2 percent antidumping measures were ever 
disputed in the WTO panel proceedings, the frequency of dispute of safeguard measures 
is much higher. About a quarter of all safeguard measures ever imposed were formerly 
disputed under the DSU and subsequently found inconsistency with WTO rules.21 The 
high possibility of disputes and the successful challenge is fairly worrisome, showing the 
incapability for Members to comply with the current rule, on the one hand, and the 
confusion incurred by the equivocal language of agreement per se and the misleading 
interpretations, on the other hand. Many loopholes and ambiguities in the current 
Safeguard Agreement should be further clarified and some disciplines should be further 
strengthened.  
 
V. Dispute Settlement Practice on Safeguard Measures under the WTO 
 
V.1 Procedural issues 
V.1.1 Panel Request and Terms of Reference 
The Panel’s terms of reference is drawn up from the panel request, which 
provides a factual and legal basis for the establishment of panel and the ambit of its 
function. It is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise for two reasons: first, 
it often forms the basis for the terms of reference of the panel pursuant to Article 7 of the 
DSU; and, second, it informs the defending party and the third parties of the legal basis of 
the complaint. Under the DSU, Article 6.2 states that the panel request “shall indicate 
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a 
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem  
21. Yong-Shik Lee, Safeguard Measure: Why Are They Not Applied Consistently With 
the Rule? Journal of World Trade, vol. 36(4), Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
641-673, 2002. 
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clearly”. Article 7 further states the standard terms of reference of the panel.22 
The issue of terms of reference in the safeguard disputes to date covered 4 
problems regarding the panel request, namely, modification or amendment to measures, 
reference to articles other than that stated in the panel request, legal basis for complaint, 
measures no longer in effect and the extended safeguard measures. 
As for the modification or amendment to the measures after panel request, the 
Panel in the Argentina-Footwear referred to the past WTO dispute settlement precedent, 
e.g., EC-Bananas, Japan-Films and Australia-Leather. There, the Panels held that 
measures not listed in the panel request or legal acts that occur subsequent to the listed 
measure may properly fall within a panel’s terms of reference if they are “directly 
related” to a measure listed in the panel request. The Panel thought that the failure to 
cover the subsequent modification within terms of reference would allow Members to 
keep “one step ahead of any WTO dispute settlement proceeding”, and thereby escape 
review. The Panel further made clear that the subsequent modifications at issue “do not 
constitute entirely new safeguard measures in the sense that they were based on a 
different safeguard investigation, but are instead modifications of the legal form of the 
original definitive measure, which remains in force in substance and which is the subject 
of the complaint”.23 Therefore, the Panel concluded that the Argentina’s modification of 
its provisional and definitive safeguard measures fell within its terms of reference.24 This 
methodology  was agreed by the Appellate Body in Chile-Agricultural Products. There, 
the Appellate Body held that amendment made after the panel was established did not  
22. See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, 1994 
23. Supra note 15, Panel Report, paras. 24-41. 
24. Ibid, paras. 45-46. 
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change the essence of the measure under challenge and concluded that the measure 
included the amendment at issue “because it amends Chile's price band system without 
changing its essence”.25 Furthermore, it is appropriate to “secure a positive solution to the 
dispute” and to make “sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow 
for prompt compliance”.26 In my view, the Panel and Appellate Body rules out some 
uncertainties incurred by Member’s practice in “bad faith” to the integrity of the 
multilateral safeguard system. 
 In addition, in Argentina-Footwear case, the Panel reached a decision under 
Article 4.2(c) by relying upon the obligations under Safeguard Article 3, which was not 
stated in the panel request. On appeal, Argentina challenged Panel’s approach and argued 
the Panel had exceeded its terms of reference under DUS Article 7. The Appellate Body 
noted that the Panel’s reference to Article 3 was in conjunction with its findings under 
Article 4.2(c) and it did not come out with a legal finding regarding Article 3. Since 
Article 4.2(c) expressly incorporates the provisions of Article 3, the Appellate Body then 
ruled that the Panel did not exceed its terms of reference, in that it could reach a 
“objective assessment of the matter” only if it could refer to Article 3 other than those 
specifically stated in the Panel request. 27 
The issue of legal basis for complaint drew much attention from the disputing 
parties and DSB in the Korea-Diary and US-Lamb Meat. In both cases, the complainants 
only listed the articles involved in the dispute without elaboration, e.g., failed to state the 
specific sub-paragraph. By reference to the EC-Bananas, the Panel in Korea-Diary ruled  
25. Supra note 19, Appellate Body Report, paras. 136-139. 
26. Ibid, para. 143. 
27. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras. 73-74. 
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that the panel request sufficiently identified the measures and thereby is “sufficiently 
detailed”.28 On appeal, the Appellate body reversed the Panel’s ruling. By examining the 
text of DSU Article 6.2, the Appellate Body stated that “mere summarily identifying” the 
legal basis of complaint is not enough; rather, the identification must “present the 
problem clearly”.29 The Appellate Body pointed out that situation deviated case by case. 
“There may be situations where the simple listing of the articles of the agreement or 
agreements involved may, in the light of attendant circumstances, suffice to meet the 
standard of clarity in the statement of the legal basis of the complaint. However, there 
may also be situations in which the circumstances are such that the mere listing of treaty 
articles would not satisfy the standard of Article 6.2. This may be the case, for instance, 
where the articles listed establish not one single, distinct obligation, but rather multiple 
obligations. In such a situation, the listing of articles of an agreement, in and of itself, 
may fall short of the standard of Article 6.2”.30 Referring to EC-Computer Equipment 
case, the Appellate Body stated that “whether the ability of the respondent to defend itself 
was prejudiced” should be taken into account, if the panel request simply listed the 
provisions claimed to have been violated.31 Considering the particular situation in this 
case, the Appellate Body denied Korea’s appeal for its failure to demonstrate its ability to 
defend itself has been prejudiced.32 The Panel in US-Lamb Meat followed this approach. 
There, the Panel further indicated that four different “attendant circumstances” 
demonstrated that the complainants had complied with the minimum requirement of DSU 
6.2, albeit they had only listed the relevant articles instead of specific sub-paragraphs.33 
28. Supra note 14, Panel Report, paras. 7.4-7.7. 
29. Supra note 14, Appellate Body Report, para. 120. 
30. Ibid, para. 124. 
31. Supra note 14, Appellate Body Report, para. 126-127. 
32. Ibid, para. 131. 
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Regarding the measures no longer in effect, the Panel in Chile-Agricultural 
Products referred to DSU Article 19.1 and found that it could make findings regarding 
the consistency of an expired provisional safeguard measure, if it considers that the 
making of such findings is necessary “to secure a positive solution” to the dispute.34 As 
for the extended safeguard measures, the Panel concluded that “the extensions are not 
distinct measures, but merely continuations in time of the definitive safeguard measures”, 
and thereby found that the definitive measure at issue were not terminated. In conclusion, 
the Panel ruled that both the provisional measures no longer in effect and the extension of 
the definitive safeguard measure were in its terms of reference, even though the extension 
is not a subject of consultation.35 
 
V.1.2 Standard of Review 
In the dispute concerning trade remedy measures, the standard of review for the 
Panel refers to the degree of scrutiny applied by the Panel to the findings and conclusions 
of the national investigation authorities. In other words, it means the level of deference 
that Panel shall give to the national authority investigations. Unlike the Antidumping 
Agreement, which embodies a specific provision setting out a special standard of review 
provision for disputes arising under the Agreement,36 the Safeguard Agreement is silent 
as to the appropriate standard of review. The Appellate Body clarified it in the Korea-
Diary, Argentina-Footwear and further elaborated it in the US-Lamb Meat.  
Noting the absence of the specific provision on standard of review in the 
Safeguard Agreement, the Panel referred to DSU Article 11, which provides:  
33. Supra note 17, Panel Report, paras. 5.32-5.47. 
34. Supra note 19, Panel Report, paras. 7.112 
35. Ibid, paras. 7.116-7.119. 
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 “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including 
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the 
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements”.37  
The Panel properly stated that it should neither conduct a de novo review of, nor 
fully defer to the national authority investigation. The standard of review of the Panel is 
somewhere in between. In order to make an “objective assessment”, the Panel must 
conduct “an examination of whether the national authority had examined all facts in its 
possession or which it should have obtained in accordance with Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards…whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the 
facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the 
determination made was consistent with the international obligations of Korea”.38 The 
Panel and Appellate Body in Argentina-Footwear and US-Wheat Gluten case shared a 
similar view.39 Later, the standard of review was elaborated by the Appellate Body in the 
US-Lamb Meat. The Appellate Body explained, “the Panel's objective assessment under 
36. Article 17.6 of Antidumping Agreement states:  
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5: 
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the 
authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of 
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper 
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have 
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; 
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel 
finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible 
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with 
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations. 
37. WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, 1994. 
38. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.30. 
39. Supra note 15, Appellate Report, paras. 116-121; and supra note 16, Panel Report, 
para. 8.4. 
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 Article 4.2(a) of the Safeguards Agreement involves a formal aspect and a substantive 
aspect. The formal aspect is whether the competent authorities have evaluated all relevant 
factors. The substantive aspect is whether the competent authorities have given a 
reasoned and adequate explanation for their determination…. including an evaluation of 
the  ‘bearing’, or the ‘influence’ or ‘effect’ or ‘impact’ that the relevant factors have on 
the ‘situation of the domestic industry’”.40 It stated further that a panel can assess the 
adequacy of a competent authorities' explanation “only if the panel critically examines 
that explanation, in depth, and in the light of the facts before the Panel. Panels must, 
therefore, review whether the competent authorities’ explanation fully addresses the 
nature, and, especially, the complexities, of the data, and responds to other plausible 
interpretations of that data. A panel must find, in particular, that an explanation is not 
reasoned, or is not adequate, if some alternative explanation of the facts is plausible, and 
if the competent authorities' explanation does not seem adequate in the light of that 
alternative explanation.”41 It seems that the national authority has to examine all the 
alternative reasoning and prove the appropriateness of its own. In addition, all of these 
reasoning and evaluation should be embodied in the investigation report. 
Generally, disputed issues consist of legal issues and factual issues. Panel review 
legal issues de novo. For example, Panel interprets the WTO rules at its full discretion 
regardless of the determination made by the national authority of Members. As to the 
factual issue, Panel accords greater deference to the national authority determination. In 
this sense, the Panel will examine the adequacy of reasoning and the scope of the facts in 
the domestic investigation.  
40. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, paras. 103-104. 
41. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, para. 106. 
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Nevertheless, what are appropriate criteria for evaluation of the level of 
adequacy? Though the Appellate Body’s ruling in US-Lamb Meat gives some reference, 
it is still not clear enough. The evaluation of adequacy reasoning is a matter of 
subjectivity. The different reasoning can be drawn from the different perspective. Some 
of them may support the determination, while some may not. Which reasoning is 
sounder? It will be difficult both for the national authority and for the Panel.  
With regard to the scope of facts, Panel in Korea-Diary case stated that Panels 
should base their examination on the investigating authority’s determination and all the 
evidence that the investigating authority gathered and reflected in the investigating report 
of the final determination.42 It was upheld by the Appellate Body. However, shall the 
national authority examine the evidence not presented to it by interested parties in the 
investigation? The Panel in the US-Wheat Gluten case ruled it is not national authority’s 
obligation.43 The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s ruling and stated authority was 
precluded from “remaining passive in the face of possible shortcomings in the evidence 
submitted” and must actively seek out pertinent information.44 The problem of 
information seeking thereby arose. What if the pertinent data is not available? In some 
instances, out of question, such a requirement would be both impractical and unrealistic. 
According to the Appellate Body ruling in US-Lamb Meat, the data before the competent 
authorities must be sufficiently representative. What is sufficient in any given case will 
depend on the particularities of the situation at issue.45 
Moreover, the degree of deference to the domestic investigation is consistent with  
42. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.30. 
43. Supra note 16, Panel Report, para. 8.6. 
44. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, para. 55 
45. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, para. 132. 
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Members’ stance towards the safeguard measure. If Members regard that safeguard 
measure should be further disciplined, less deference will be given to the domestic 
investigation. By contrast, If Members think that more incentives should be provided to 
encourage the use of the safeguards, greater deference seems necessary. Since the WTO 
Members themselves are facing the dilemma of the choice between “tightening the 
discipline” and “relaxing the discipline”, a specific and strict standard of review may 
cause problems as well. 
 
V.2. Substantive issues 
V.2.1 Relationship between GATT Article XIX and Safeguard Agreement 
The continuing applicability of GATT Article XIX was challenged by Uruguay 
Round Safeguard Agreement since its coming into force. The Safeguard Agreement 
states in its preamble that Members recognize “the need to clarify and reinforce the 
disciplines of GATT 1994, and specifically those of its Article XIX….”.46 Then, Article 1 
provides that “the Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures 
which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 
1994”.47 In addition, Article 10 requires Members to terminate all existing safeguard 
measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1947 no later than eight years after 
their application or five years after the WTO agreement takes effect, which ever comes 
later.48 Article 11.1(a) emphasizes that Members “shall not take or seek any emergency 
action on imports of particular products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994 unless 
such action conforms with the provisions of that Article applied in accordance with this  
46. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
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Agreement”.49 Practically, no language in Safeguard Agreement defines the legal 
relationship between GATT Article XIX and Safeguard Agreement. 
The issue was raised in three WTO safeguard cases, i.e., Argentina-Footwear, 
Korea-Dairy and US-Lamb Meat, and was thereby addressed by Appellate Body. In both 
the Argentina-Footwear and Korea-Dairy, the Panels concluded that safeguard measures 
that meet the requirements of the Safeguard Agreement are necessarily consistent with 
the requirements GATT Article XIX, therefore, GATT Article XIX does not add any 
independent obligation to Members.50 However, the Appellate Body overruled the 
Panels’ decision. In reaching the conclusion, the Appellate Body first referred to Article 
II of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO 
Agreement), which provides the agreements and associated legal instruments included in 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3…. are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members”.51 
By this provision, the Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Safeguard Agreement are 
“integral parts” of the WTO Agreement and “binding on all Members”. “And, an 
appropriate reading of this ‘inseparable package of rights and disciplines’ must, 
accordingly, be one that gives meaning to all the relevant provisions of these two equally 
binding agreements”.52 Then, the Appellate Bodies moved to Article 1 and Article 11.1(a) 
of the Safeguard Agreement and found that the literal language thereof suggests “any 
safeguard measure imposed after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement must 
comply with the provisions of both the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the  
49. Ibid. 
50. Supra note 15, Panel Report paras.8.50-57, 8.69. 
51. WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994. 
52. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras.79-81; and supra note 14, Appellate 
Body Report, paras.74-77. 
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GATT 1994”.53 Later in the US-Lamb Meat case, the Panel followed the Appellate Body 
decision in the Argentina-Footwear and Korea-Dairy cases.54 
It is clear now that the Safeguard Agreement does not entirely replace GATT 
Article XIX. Instead, the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and of the 
Agreement on Safeguards would apply cumulatively, except to the extent of a conflict 
between specific provisions. 
 
V.2.2  Unforeseen Developments 
 
The “unforeseen developments” requirement stated in GATT Article XIX has 
always been a critical controversy since its existence. The issue was first raised in the 
US-Hatter’s Fur in the early GATT period and its legal implication was reviewed several 
times by WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies.  
With reference to the GATT Article XIX 1(a), 55 
“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is 
being imported into the territory of that Member in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that 
territory of like or directly competitive products, the Member shall be free, in respect of 
such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or 
modify the concession. (emphasis added)” 
53. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras.82-84; and supra note 14, Appellate 
Body Report, para.78. 
54. See supra note 17, Panel Report para.7.11. 
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55. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994 
Also as Article 2.1 of the Safeguard Agreement states:56 
“A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has 
determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported 
into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, 
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic 
industry that produces like or directly competitive products. (footnote omitted)” 
In comparing the language in these two paragraphs, the requirement of “as a result 
of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member 
under this Agreement, including tariff concessions”, embodied by GATT Article XIX 
1(a), was omitted from the text of Safeguard Agreement. Does it mean that the 
“unforeseen developments” requirement would not have legal effect since the entry into 
force of WTO Agreement? Alternatively, if it is still applicable, what does it imply? How 
will it be applied and influence the safeguard system? 
Based on the conclusion that the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and 
of the Agreement on Safeguards would apply cumulatively and all the relevant provisions 
should be given the meaning, the Appellate Body in Argentina-Footwear and Korea-
Dairy cases ruled that “unforeseen developments” does have meaning. In their view, if 
the negotiators “had intended to expressly omit this clause, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators would and could have said so in the Safeguard Agreement. They did not.”57 
By virtue of this inference, the Appellate Body began to interpret the meaning of 
“unforeseen developments”. Having noted that the dictionary meaning for “unforeseen” 
is synonymous with “unexpected”, the Appellate Body concluded that the ordinary  
56. Ibid. 
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57. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, para. 88; and supra note 14, Appellate Body 
Report, para. 82. 
meaning of the phrase "as a result of unforeseen developments" requires that the 
developments which led to a product being imported in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic 
producers must have been "unexpected".58 While the Appellate Body does not view the 
first clause of GATT Article XIX “as independent conditions for the application of a 
safeguard measure additional to the conditions set forth in the second clause of that 
paragraph”,59 it does believe that “the first clause describes certain circumstances which 
must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a safeguard measure to be applied 
consistently with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994”.60  
However, it remains unclear that how the “independent condition” distinct from 
“factual circumstances”. The Panel in US-Lamb Meat cases regarded the latter implied a 
lesser threshold than the former. Based on the previous Appellate Body decisions, the 
Panel further made a distinction between “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable”, such that the 
safeguard determination must be specific to the factual circumstances of the particular 
case, that is, what was and was not actually "foreseen", rather than what might or might 
not have been theoretically “foreseeable”.61 As to the coverage of “unforeseen 
developments”, the Panel refers to the GATT US-Hatter’s Fur case, in which the 
Working Party focused on the scale of the particular change in fashion and its duration as 
well as the degree of its impact on the competitive situation. With respect to when and 
where the “unforeseen development” should be demonstrated, the Appellate Body see a  
58. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, para. 91; and supra note 14, Appellate Body 
Report, para. 84. 
59. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, para. 92; and supra note 14, Appellate Body 
Report, para. 85. 
60. Ibid. 
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61. Supra note 17, Panel Report, paras. 7.21-7.22. 
logical connection between the conditions set forth in Article XIX and the 
“circumstances”, such as “unforeseen developments”. The Appellate Body then ruled that 
the “logical connection” “dictates that the demonstration of the existence of these 
circumstances must also feature in the same report of the competent authorities”.62 
Consequently, the “unforeseen development” as a “factual circumstances” must be 
demonstrated in the published report before the safeguard measure is applied. In finding 
the US failed to meet the demonstration requirement, the Appellate Body executed 
judicial economy and did not examine what is the standard to establish and how to 
evaluate “unforeseen developments”. 
The Panel in Argentina-Peaches further clarified that the factual demonstration of 
the existence of “unforeseen developments” was a “prerequisite” for and should be made 
in the competent authorities’ report before application of a safeguard measure.63 Yet, It 
does not agree with the Appellate Body’s interpretation in Argentina-Footwear that the 
increased quantities of imports should have been “unforeseen” or “unexpected”. It held 
that the link between “imports in such increased quantities and under such conditions” 
and the “unforeseen developments”, under which the former was resulted from the latter, 
meant that they were two distinct things and must not be equated. Based on the above 
ruling, the Panel later stated that the increase in imports, or the way in which they were 
being imported, was unforeseen does not constitute a demonstration of the existence of 
“unforeseen developments.”64 As to the factors constituting “unforeseen developments”, 
the Panel said the supporting reasoning should be provided first, and then the specific 
developments should be “unforeseen” at time the relevant obligation was negotiated, 
62. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, para. 72. 
63. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.13-7.14. 
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64. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.17-7.24. 
which were required to be demonstrated in the report.65 In my view, the Panel’s approach 
in interpretation of the requirement is based on the original literal meaning of the treaty 
and thereby acceptable in this sense. But, how the Appellate Body will rule on it remains 
an unknown question. 
The dispute settlement practice regarding safeguards to date suggests that the 
incorporation of the “unforeseen development” requirement into the current safeguard 
system is necessary and consistent with the WTO rules. However, the purpose of the 
Safeguard Agreement is to clarify and reinforce the GATT safeguard disciplines, 
especially those in Article XIX. Resurrecting the old clause in Article XIX as a legal 
requirement would undermine the clarity and discourage the use of safeguards.66  
Firstly, as shown in the dispute settlement, the Panel and Appellate Body 
interpreted “unforeseen” as “unexpected” and considered the distinction between 
“unforeseen” and “unforeseeable” is important, in that the former term implies a lesser 
threshold than the latter one. It implies that even though the relevant development is 
foreseeable, the Member’s failure to foresee it is justifiable. This interpretation opens a 
very dangerous door to encourage Members’ inadvertence in application of safeguard 
measures. Besides, the Panel and Appellate Body’s explanation of the distinction 
between “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable” does not make much sense. In order to 
explain the difference, the Panel and Appellate Body refers to the Working Party’s ruling 
in US-Hatter’s Fur, which states: “the term ‘unforeseen developments’ should be 
interpreted to mean developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff  
65. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.24-7.30. 
66. Yong-Shik Lee, Destabilization of the Discipline on Safeguards?: Inherent Problems 
with the Continuing Application of Article XIX after the Settlement of the Agreement 
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of Safeguards, Journal of World Trade, vol. 35(6), 1235-1346, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International, 2001. 
concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country 
making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession 
was negotiated”.67 The interpretation is quite controversial. It seems that the Working 
Party actually apply the criteria of foreseeability in that case. Here the Working Party 
interpreted the “unforeseen development” must occur after the negotiation of relevant 
tariff concession. What if the tariff concession was negotiated in Kennedy Round? Based 
on this interpretation, it may be justifiable for Members to claim any development as 
“unforeseen” after a lapse of 35 years since the conclusion of the negotiation. What’s 
more, as a matter of subjective requirement, it is very difficult to judge the degree and 
adequacy of the “unforeseen developments” on an objective basis, especially when the 
standard of which remain unknown in the dispute settlement practice. In general, the 
equivocal wording of “unforeseen developments” and the ambiguous interpretation leads 
to confusion, resulting in the fact that this requirement has been one of the most 
frequently disputed issues under the WTO DSU. 
Secondly, the Appellate Body’s reasoning is questionable. In their view, if the 
negotiators “had intended to expressly omit this clause, the Uruguay Round negotiators 
would and could have said so in the Safeguard Agreement. They did not.”68 Insofar as I 
can see, if the negotiators had intended to keep “unforeseen developments” in effect, they 
would and could have said so in the Safeguard Agreement, as they did in the 
Antidumping Agreement.69 But they did not. The approach may be not so sound. 
However, if we look into the negotiation history of the Safeguard Agreement, the earlier 
67. GATT documents, Report of the Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of 
Czechoslovakia Concerning the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff 
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Concession under the Terms of Article XIX, ("Hatters' Fur"), GATT/CP/106, 22 
October 1951. 
68. Supra note 57. 
draft of the Safeguard Agreement containing the clause of “unforeseen developments” 
was rejected by major trading Members.70 It reveals the fact that the omission of the 
clause was intentional. In this sense, the Panel interpretation in Argentina-Footwear and 
Korea-Diary cases is consistent with the negotiating history. 
Thirdly, going back to the most fundamental question, why is safeguard necessary 
in the multilateral trading system? As explained in the earlier section, for one thing, 
safeguard is emergency protection against fair trade practice for restoration of 
competitiveness and orderly contraction; for another thing, it serves as a safety valve. As 
emergency protection against fair trade practice, it must be strictly disciplined. As safety 
valve, Members shall encourage its use in alternative for unilateral protective practices, 
such as ERAs and antidumping, to further trade liberalization. Is the revival of the 
“unforeseen developments” clause helpful to these two requirements? The facts suggest 
that deeper ambiguity incurred by this clause causes destructive confusions, which would 
undermine the integrity and development of the safeguard system. 
 
 
69. Article 1 of Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement” states: An anti-dumping 
measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of 
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement. The following provisions govern the 
application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action is taken under anti-
dumping legislation or regulations. See WTO, Antidumping Agreement, 1994. 
70. Indeed, the inclusion of an “unforeseen” test in the June 1989 negotiating draft of the 
Safeguard Agreement was rejected in the July 1990 negotiating draft. Ironically, the 
Members rejected the 1989 draft included EC, the complainant arguing for the 
effectiveness of “unforeseen developments” in both Argentina-Footwear and Korea-
Diary cases. See Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992), vol. 2: Commentary, Table 6, p.1791, Boston: Kluwer Law. 
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V.2.3 Applicability of Article XIII of GATT 1994 
Article XIII (See Appendix 3) of GATT 1994 provides the non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions.71 Safeguard Agreement Article 5 also deals 
with some of the issues regarding quantitative restrictions that are found in Article XIII of 
GATT 1994, i.e., level of quantitative restriction72 and methodologies of quota 
allocation73. However, Safeguard Agreement Article 5 does not cover the administration 
of tariff quota, which falls within the ambit of Article XIII: 5 of GATT 1994. Can Article 
XIII: 5 of GATT 1994 apply to Safeguard Agreement? This issue became prominent in 
US-Line Pipe case. 
There, Korea argued that the safeguard measure of the US, as a tariff quota, was 
subject to the requirement of GATT Article XIII, while the US opposed. The US referred 
to Appellate Body Report in Argentina-Footwear and argued that Safeguard Agreement 
incorporates Article XIX, not Article XIII.74 The Panel first made clear that the safeguard 
measure applied by the US was in the form of tariff quota an Article XIII “expressly 
applies to tariff quota by virtue of Article XIII: 5”.75 Examining the Appellate Body’s  
71. See WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994. 
72. Safeguard Agreement Article 5.1 provides, “A Member shall apply safeguard 
measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to 
facilitate adjustment. If a quantitative restriction is used, such a measure shall not 
reduce the quantity of imports below the level of a recent period which shall be the 
average of imports in the last three representative years for which statistics are 
available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury. Members should choose measures most suitable for 
the achievement of these objectives”. 
73. Safeguard Agreement Article 5.2(a) provides, “In cases in which a quota is allocated 
among supplying countries, the Member applying the restrictions may seek 
agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other 
Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In cases in 
which this method is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to 
Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the 
proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, of 
the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any 
special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product”. 
74. Supra note 18, Panel Report, paras. 7.25-7.27. 
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approach in Argentina-Footwear, the Panel noted that the Appellate Body found the 
GATT and Safeguard Agreement are integral part of the WTO Agreement and nothing in 
its report suggests that Article XIX applies in the context of safeguard measures to the 
exclusion of other GATT provisions. Besides, by reference to the Appellate Body 
statement in EC-Bananas, the panel found that nothing in the Safeguard Agreement 
authorizes nullity of Article XIII.76 As for the argument of express omission of provision 
governing tariff quota in the text of Safeguard Agreement, the Panel applied the same 
logic in Argentina-Footwear Appellate Body proceeding, holding that all of the relevant 
terms of the WTO Agreement should be given the meaning.77 The Panel also ruled that 
the effectiveness of Article XIII is not eroded by some duplication in Article XIII and 
Safeguard Agreement.78 Furthermore, the Panel rebutted the policy-based argument of 
the US. The Panel said, as a matter of policy, “non-application of Article XIII in the 
context of safeguards would result in tariff quota safeguard measures partially escaping 
the control of multilateral disciplines. This result would be contrary to the objectives set 
out in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement”. In consequence, the Panel concluded 
that the GATT Article XIII is applicable to safeguard measure.79 
Under the Panel’s ruling, Members must ensure that their safeguard measures 
taken in the form of quantitative restriction, either quota or tariff quota, must comply with 
the requirement of GATT Article XIII. This ruling has not been appealed until now. 
Whether it will be upheld by the panel and the Appellate Body in the future disputes 
remains to be seen. In economic sense, however, tariff quota has less adverse effects to 
75. Ibid, para. 7.30. 
76. Ibid, paras. 7.31-7.38. 
77. Ibid, paras. 7.41-7.44. 
78. Ibid, paras. 7.45-7.47. 
79. Ibid, para. 7.49. 
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international trade and the total social welfare, compared with strict quantitative 
restrictions. In addition, taking into account the facts of the overwhelming application of  
ERAs and antidumping measures during the pre-Uruguay period, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators seemed to intentionally create the incentive for the use of tariff quota as 
safeguard instead of strict quantitative restriction and ERAs, with a view to reducing the 
social welfare loss and mitigating the instability. Therefore, putting the tariff quota under 
more stringent discipline actually undermines the Uruguay Round negotiation results. 
 
V.2.4 Increased Imports 
For a safeguard measure to be imposed, Members must demonstrate the existence 
of increased imports first. Article 2.1 of the Safeguard Agreement states, a safeguard 
measure can be applied only if “such product is being imported into its territory in such 
increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that 
produces like or directly competitive products”. Article 4.2(a) also incorporates “the rate 
and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative 
terms” into the relevant factors that should be evaluated in the investigation.80 
Since it is one of the prerequisites for imposition of a safeguard measure, the issue 
of “increased imports” has several opportunities to be scrutinized by the panels and 
Appellate Body.  
The issue first arose in the dispute of Argentina-Footwear, the Panel found and 
the Appellate Body affirmed that Argentina’s “end-point-to-end-point comparison” 
80. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
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ignoring the intervening declining trend over the investigation period is inconsistent with 
Article 2.1. “The competent authorities are required to consider the trends in imports over 
the period of investigation (rather than just comparing the end points) under Article 
4.2(a)”.81 In interpreting “products is being imported…. in such increased quantities”, 
however, the Appellate Body opined that the Panel’s interpretation is “somewhat 
lacking”. In this respect, the Appellate Body did not think Argentina’s examination of the 
import trend in five-year historical period was reasonable. Instead, they believe that 
“recent imports” should be examined, and not simply trends in imports during several-
year period or just any increased quantities of imports would suffice. “The increase in 
imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant 
enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury”.82 This ruling was adopted by the panels in the subsequent cases. Later, the 
Appellate Body in US-Lamb Meat further indicated “in conducting their evaluation under 
Article 4.2(a), competent authorities cannot rely exclusively on data from the most recent 
past, but must assess that data in the context of the data for the entire investigative 
period”. “The period of investigation must, of course, be sufficiently long to allow 
appropriate conclusions to be drawn regarding the state of the domestic industry”.83 The 
Panel in Argentina-Peaches also thought that “a recent and sharp increase in imports is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to satisfy Article 2.1 and Article XIX:1(a),” and 
“this increase must be qualitative as well as quantitative”.84 “The increased import in the 
most recent past should not be considered separately from the overall trends during the  
81. Supra note 15, Panel Report, paras.153-159; Appellate Body Report para. 129. 
82. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras. 130-131. 
83. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, para. 138. 
84. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.53-7.55. 
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period of analysis.”85 As for the period for the investigation, the Panel said that there was 
no provision establishing a minimum period or any required “based period” for the 
determination of the import increase.86 
In respect of the methodology the national authority applied in investigation, 
noting the relevant WTO provisions contain no requirement as to how long the period of 
investigation should be, nor do they suggest how a period should be broken down, the 
Panel in US-Line Pipe gave national authority the discretion. Particularly in this case, the 
USITC compared the first-half 1999 data with first-half 1998 data, rather than to the 
second semester of 1998. This methodology was questioned by Korea in the Panel 
proceeding. However, Panel thought, “the word ‘recent’ – which was used by the 
Appellate Body in interpreting the phrase ‘is being imported’ – implies some form of 
retrospective analysis. It does not imply an analysis of the conditions immediately 
preceding the authority's decision. Nor does it imply that the analysis must focus 
exclusively on conditions at the very end of the period of investigation”. Therefore, in 
Panel’s view, USITC’s methodology of comparing the data of the first-half of both years 
is unbiased and objective.87 Reviewing the existence of absolute or relative import 
increase, the Panel noted the wording of “increased imports” instead of “increasing 
imports” in Article 2.1. The Panel considered the use of the word “increased” implied 
that “there is no need for a determination that imports are presently still increasing. 
Rather, imports could have ‘increased’ in the recent past, but not necessarily be 
increasing up to the end of the period of investigation or immediately preceding the  
85. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.64-7.65. 
86. Supra note 20, Panel Report, paras. 7.50. 
87. Supra note 18, Panel Report, paras. 7.204-7.205. 
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determination”. “There can still be a ‘recent’ increase even if that increase has ceased 
prior to the date of the determination, provided imports remain at a sharply increased 
level.”88 
The Panel’s ruling in US-Line Pipe gives much deference to the national 
authority’s investigation. Under this ruling, Members may adopt their own methodology 
in investigation, as long as their application permits an adequate, reasoned and reasonable 
support for the determination with respect to increased imports. Whether it is adequate or 
reasoned is still up to the subjective judgment. Furthermore, there is no provision 
regarding the length and timing of the period under investigation, nor the way in which 
the period can be broken down. Must the period selected be continuous? Can it be 
discrete? These may leave Members room for data manipulation. For example, if the 
national authority just arbitrarily selects so called “representative period” which is not 
reasonably long enough for an objective assessment, in which import increases due to 
some big projects and it also happens to increase “recently”. Albeit for the fact that 
import generally shows a decreasing trend over a longer period, safeguard may be 
justifiable under this ruling. 
According to Panel’s conclusion in US-Line Pipe, though the imports cease 
increase or even decrease before the determination, the Members may still be qualified to 
apply safeguard measure, so long as they can demonstrated recent import increase and 
serious injury or threat thereof caused by the import increase. The question is how recent 
it should be. Should an import increase stops 6 months before the determination be 
considered as “recent”? Then how about one year, or one month? What’s more, the cease  
88. Ibid, paras. 7.207-7.208. 
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of import increase may be attributed to a long-term economic recession, and imports may 
continue decreasing during a long period in the future. In that case, it may be not 
necessary to impose safeguard. 
 
V.2.5 Domestic Industry 
Domestic industry is a critical issue in the determination of the serious injury and 
threat thereof. The Safeguard Agreement Article 4.1(c) states, “in determining injury or 
threat thereof, a ‘domestic industry’ shall be understood to mean the producers as a whole 
of the like or directly competitive products operating within the territory of a Member, or 
those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a 
major proportion of the total domestic production of those products”.89 So far, only one 
case concerning the definition of “domestic industry” has been under the scrutiny of the 
WTO Appellate Body, that is, US-Lamb Meat. 
In US-Lamb Meat, the US investigation authority, USITC, included packers and 
breakers of lamb meat and growers and feeders of live lambs in the investigation, in that 
there is “a continuous line of production from the raw to the processed products”, and “a 
substantial coincidence of economic interest between the growers and the processors”. 
Australia and New Zealand challenged this definition before the DSB.90 By examining 
the ordinary meaning of Article 4.1(c), the Panel found that “a given enterprise can be 
considered as a producer of only those goods that it actually makes. By this logic, a 
producer that makes primary or intermediate goods used in the production of further 
processed goods must be considered a producer of the primary or intermediate good,  
89. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
90. Supra note 17, Panel Report, paras. 7.48-7.49. 
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rather than of the processed good that it does not itself ever produce”.91 It then pointed 
out that the phrase “producers as a whole” provides “a quantitative benchmark for the 
proportion of producers….which a safeguards investigation has to cover”, while not 
broadens the scope of domestic industry by including upstream products.92 Given the 
similarity in the definitions of “domestic industry”, the Panel referred to the previous 
GATT cases in the antidumping and countervailing context, namely, US-Wine and Grape, 
Canada-Beef and New Zealand-Transformers, and then rejected the US’s reasoning for a 
broader definition of domestic industry.93 As to US argument that there is value added at 
different stage of processing, the Panel found that the benefit of safeguard measure in 
respect of finished products can also be passed back to the input producers, if the serious 
injury caused by increased imports can be felt by the input producers.94 Reviewing the 
negotiating history, the Panel also found that provision remained unchanged in the 
Uruguay negotiation, in that the negotiating parties opposed a try to broaden the meaning 
of domestic industry.95 In light of the above reasoning, the Panel ruled that USITC acted 
inconsistently with the Article 4.1(c) by improperly broadening the definition of domestic 
industry. On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel’s decision96 and 
considered, “under Article 4.1(c), input products can only be included in defining the 
‘domestic industry’ if they are ‘like or directly competitive’ with the end-products. If an  
91. Ibid, para. 7.70. 
92. Ibid, para. 7.74. 
93. Ibid, paras. 7.101-7.104. 
94. Ibid, paras. 7.105-7.108. 
95. Ibid, paras. 7.110-7.114. 
96. In the panel proceeding, by reference to the GATT Canada-Beef case, the panel 
regarded separability of production processes as a key factor in identifying the 
domestic producers of a like product and then examined this factor. The Appellate 
Body cautioned the Panel against the examination and stressed that the focus should 
be on the identification of products. See supra note 17, Panel Report, para. 100; and 
Appellate Body Report, paras. 92-94. 
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input product and an end-product are not ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive’, then it is 
irrelevant, under the Agreement on Safeguards, that there is a continuous line of 
production between an input product and an end-product, that the input product 
represents a high proportion of the value of the end-product, that there is no use for the 
input product other than as an input for the particular end-product, or that there is a 
substantial coincidence of economic interests between the producers of these products”.97 
The Appellate Body concluded further that the “focus must…. be on the identification of 
the products, and their ‘like or directly competitive’ relationship, and not on the processes 
by which those products are produced”.98 In the later dispute of Chile-Agricultural 
Products, the Panel followed this Approach. 
The Appellate Body in this case ruled out the input producer and the processors 
from the scope of the domestic industry of the like and directly competitive products. 
This ruling successfully reduces some uncertainties in Members’ injury investigation. 
Nonetheless, there are still some ambiguities existing in the Article 4.1(c). According to 
the text, domestic industry can mean those whose collective output of the like or directly 
competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of 
those products. First, how much proportion can be regarded as “major proportion”? So 
far, there is no clear answer. It may be also a matter of subjective judgment. Second, does 
“like or directly competitive products” mean the relation of “either one or the other” or 
“either one or the other or both”? By the conclusion the Appellate Body made in US-Line 
Pipe with respect to injury test, both interpretations make sense. Moving one step further 
on that ruling, the situation of the “like” or “directly competitive products” indicates 
97. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, para. 90. 
98. Ibid, para. 94. 
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different levels of injury, hence the different extent of safeguard measures. As such, 
national investigating authority has the discretion to choose the scope of investigation. If 
so, uncertainties thereby incurred will seriously undermine the current safeguard system.  
 
V.2.6 Serious Injury and Threat Thereof 
Safeguard measures are applied to remedy the serious injury and threat thereof 
that increased imports bring about to the domestic industry. Therefore, the injury test, i.e., 
the investigation and determination of serious injury and threat thereof, is a core step for 
imposing safeguard measure. Correspondingly, the issue of serious injury and threat 
thereof has been the most acrimonious and frequently disputed topic throughout the 
GATT and WTO era. All the 6 disputes addressed by WTO DSB cover this issue. 
Article 2.1 in Safeguard Agreement mandates an injury test for safeguard measure. 
Article 4.1(a) and (b) give the definition of serious injury and threat of serious injury 
respectively. There, “serious injury” is understood to mean a significant overall 
impairment in the position of a domestic industry, while “threat of serious injury” is 
defined as serious injury that is clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 2. The determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be 
based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. Further, 
Article 4.2(a) sets forth the factors that should be investigated in the injury determination 
It provides, “In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or 
are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this 
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective 
and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the 
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rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and 
relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in 
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and 
employment”.99 
Four legal aspects concerning injury test were discussed in the panel and 
Appellate Body proceeding, namely, examination of all relevant factors, requirement of 
serious injury and threat thereof, methodology applied in domestic injury investigation, 
representativeness of data. 
As to the examination of the relevant factors, the Panel in Korea-Diary opined 
that it is mandatory for Members to evaluate the relevance of all of the listed factors in 
Article 4.2(a), although some factors may be dismissed later as irrelevant to the serious 
injury under investigation.100 The Panel and Appellate Body in Argentina-Footwear 
adopted the same interpretation. The Appellate Body there further stated, “Article 4.2(a) 
of the Agreement on Safeguards requires a demonstration that the competent authorities 
evaluated, at a minimum, each of the factors listed in Article 4.2(a) as well as all other 
factors that are relevant to the situation of the industry concerned”.101 The Panel in 
Argentina-Peaches followed the same methodology.102 In US-Wheat Gluten, the 
Appellate Body indicated that national authorities should actively seek out pertinent 
information and must fully investigate other relevant factors, not only those clearly raised 
before them as relevant by the interested parties in the investigation. Yet, the national 
authorities do not have an “open-ended and unlimited” duty to investigate all available 
facts.103 
99. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
100. See supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.55. 
101. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, para. 136. 
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The Appellate Body in Argentina-Footwear had the first chance to elaborate the 
requirement of serious injury. Under Safeguard Agreement Article 4.1(a), the Appellate 
Body asserted that “it is only when the overall position of the domestic industry is 
evaluated, in light of all the relevant factors having a bearing on a situation of that 
industry, that it can be determined whether there is ‘a significant overall impairment’ in 
the position of that industry”.104 In US-Wheat Gluten, the Panel considered that “any 
determination of serious injury must pertain to the recent past”. “It is essential that 
current serious injury is found to exist, up to and including the very end of the period of 
investigation”. It further clarified that “although certain factors were not declining, the 
overall picture could nonetheless still demonstrate ‘significant overall impairment’ of the 
industry”.105 Later the Appellate Body in US-Lamb Meat noted that the standard of 
serious injury is a very high one in contrast with the standard in antidumping and 
countervailing case.106 Also in that case, regarding threat of serious injury, the Appellate 
Body noted that it is the “serious injury” which as not yet occurred, but “remains a future 
event whose actual materialization cannot, in fact, be assured with certainty”. “There 
must be a high degree of likelihood that the anticipated serious injury will materialize in 
the very near future”. “As a matter of fact, it must manifest that the domestic industry is 
one the brink of suffering serious injury”.107  Therefore, the determination of threat of 
serious injury is “future oriented’ but “fact-based”. “Evidence from the most recent past 
will provide the strongest indication of the likely future state of the domestic industry”.  
102. Supra note 20, Panel Report, para. 7.96. 
103. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, paras. 52-55. Also see discussion in the 
“Standard of Review”, Part V.1.2 of this Article. 
104. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, para. 139. 
105. Supra note 16, Panel Report, paras. 8.81-8.85. 
106. Supra note17, Appellate Body Report, para. 124. 
107. Ibid, para. 125. 
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However, it should be considered in the context of entire investigating period, as 
Appellate Body stated, “the real significance of the short-term trends in the most recent 
data, evident at the end of the period of investigation, may only emerge when those short-
term trends are assessed in the light of the longer-term trends in the data for the whole 
period of investigation”.108 The Appellate Body in US-Line Pipe furthered this 
interpretation. There, they noted that the two notions are different and distinct. Present 
serious injury is often preceded in time by and is something beyond a threat thereof.  
“Threat of serious injury” serves as a lower threshold for establishing the right to apply a 
safeguard measure, meaning that a safeguard measure may be applied so long as there is 
a determination of at least an existence of “threat”.109 The Panel in Argentina-Peaches 
further established two standards for the determination of a threat of serious injury: one 
regarding the “capacity” of the imports to cause injury and the other regarding the 
“sensitivity” of the domestic market. Besides, the Panel’s finding also showes the 
significance of the requirement for the investigating authorities to address the alternative 
explanations in their reasoning, especially when the data are ambiguous and an 
alternative explanation has been offered.110 
Two types of methodology applied by the national authority in investigation has 
fallen under the scrutiny of the Panel. In Korea-Diary, the Panel stated that an appropriate 
market segment analysis has two options. One is that the national authority considers 
each factor for all segments. Otherwise, if it decides to examine it for only one or some 
segment(s), it must provide an explanation of how the segment(s) chosen is (are)  
108. Ibid, paras. 136-138. 
109. Supra note 18, Appellate Report, paras. 165-170. 
110. Supra note 20, Panel Report, para. 7.105-7.116. 
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objectively representative of the whole industry.111 In Argentina-Footwear, the Panel 
reviewed the end-point-to-end-point comparisons of the changes in the situation of the 
industry applied by Argentina, without consideration of intervening trends, is very 
unlikely to provide a full evaluation of all relevant factors as required.112  
Representativeness of the data collected and evaluated determines the accuracy of 
the injury investigation. In US-Wheat Gluten, the Panel recognized that complete data 
coverage may not always be possible and is not required, in that there may be 
circumstances in a particular case that do not allow an investigating authority to obtain 
such coverage.113 Noting that Article 4.2(a) mandates Members to evaluate all relevant 
factors of an “objective and quantifiable” nature, the Appellate Body in US-Lamb Meat 
ruled that “the data evaluated by the competent authorities must be ‘sufficiently 
representative’ of the ‘domestic industry’ to allow determinations to be made about that 
industry”. How sufficient? It depends on the particularities of the “domestic industry” at 
issue in each case.114 
Although the Panel and Appellate Body has clarified many ambiguities existing in 
the Safeguard Agreement, some problems remain unclear and some become even more 
confusing.  
Firstly, it is clear now that Members are obliged to evaluate all the relevant 
factors, no matter it is listed in the Article 4.2(a) or not. The investigating authorities have 
to seek out the relevant information. But, it’s not an “open-ended and unlimited” duty to 
investigating authorities. Then, what is the extent for the investigating authorities to meet  
111. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 8.217. 
112. Supra note 15, Panel Report, para. 7.58. 
113. Supra note 16, Panel Report, para. 8.54. 
114. Supra note 17, Appellate Report, paras. 128-132. 
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this duty? Merely declaring the obligation without elaboration or explanation can only 
add to the confusion. 
Secondly, it is questionable that Members is justified to impose a safeguard 
measure without distinguishing the effect of serious injury and threat thereof, so long as 
threat of serious injury exists. “Serious injury” and “threat of serious injury” represent 
different level of injury and different factual situation of the domestic industry. 
According to Article 3.1 and Article 4.2(c), findings and reasoned conclusions reached on 
all pertinent issues of fact and law, including detailed analysis, should be shown in the 
published report. In this sense, is it sound to impose safeguard measure without 
identifying the factual situation of the domestic industry? On the other hand, I also agree 
that existence of threat of serious injury gives Members lower threshold for the 
application of safeguard measures. However, the relevant factors examined may have 
different effect. Some may cause serious injury, while some may lead to threat of serious 
injury. Can threat of serious injury caused by factor A be attributed to factor B that 
actually leads to serious injury? If it can, then how to guarantee the appropriateness of the 
safeguard measure? If it cannot, the distinction of the effect of “serious injury” and 
“threat of serious injury” should be demonstrated. 
Thirdly, in Korea-Diary, the Panel considered justifiable Korea’s practice of 
excluding certain products from the scope of application of the measure that were 
nevertheless included in the calculation of the increase in imports, in that excluded 
products account for a very minor portion of the subject imports. The exclusion may be 
justifiable, but lack of legal basis. There is no provision authorizes Member to exclude 
certain products from application of safeguard measure while include them in the imports 
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calculation. In this sense, a standard of “de miminis” level of importation and a provision 
authorizing this kind of exclusion may be necessary in Safeguard Agreement.  
The selective time period of investigation is also troublesome. Like in the 
investigation of increased imports, it may also lead to data manipulation. Members may 
choose the time period that can be easy for them to impose a safeguard measure. 
Data collection is another problem. Panel and Appellate Body have recognized 
this problem and only required “sufficient representative” data. In order to let Members 
have a reference on the issue of “sufficiency”, a standard should be established as well. 
Lastly, even though it has been noted that the serious injury is ‘a significant 
overall impairment’ in the position of that industry, and the injury level is higher than 
“material injury”, how to measure the “overall impairment” and how much difference 
between “serious injury” and “material injury” remain unclear. Maybe it cannot be 
quantified, but there must be some practical standard at least. 
 
V.2.7 Causal Link and Non-Attribution 
Article 4.2(b) sets forth the requirement of causal link and non-attribution in the 
injury investigation. It states, “The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not 
be made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the 
existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and 
serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing 
injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to 
increased imports”.115 Similar requirement can be found in the Article 2.1, which 
115. WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994 
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provides, “….such products is being imported….and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury to domestic industry….”.116 
Three requirements are embodied in the abovementioned provisions, namely, 
causal link, condition of competition and non-attribution, and were considered by the 
WTO Panels and Appellate Body. 
The Panel in Argentina-Footwear had the first chance to review these 
requirements. The Panel developed and later affirmed by Appellate Body a three-step 
approach in the analysis of causation. As the Panel stated, it would consider the adequacy 
of Argentina’s causation analysis on the basis of “(a) whether an upward trend in imports 
coincides with downward trends in the injury factors, and if not, whether a reasoned 
explanation is provided as to why nevertheless the data show causation; (b) whether the 
conditions of competition in the Argentine footwear market between imported and 
domestic footwear as analyzed demonstrate, on the basis of objective evidence, a causal 
link of the imports to any injury; and (c) whether other relevant factors have been 
analyzed and whether it is established that injury caused by factors other than imports has 
not been attributed to imports”.117 This approach has been followed by the subsequent 
Panels and Appellate Body in dispute settlement.  
 As regards the requirement of causation, the Panel and the Appellate Body in 
Argentina-Footwear considered the relationship between the movements in imports and 
injury factors as central to a causation analysis and determination.118 In US-Wheat Gluten, 
the Panel came out with the statement that increased imports alone cause serious 
injury.119 Yet, the Appellate Body reversed this ruling and interpreted “causal link” as “a 
116. WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994. 
117. Supra note 15, Panel Report, para. 8.229. 
118. Supra note 15, Panel Report, para. 8.237; Appellate Body Report, para. 144. 
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relationship of cause and effect such that increased imports contribute to ‘bringing about’, 
‘producing’ or ‘inducing’ the serious injury”. “The ‘causal link’ between increased 
imports and serious injury may exist, even though other factors are also contributing, at the 
same time, to the situation of the domestic industry”. The Appellate Body also said that 
increased imports were not necessary to be “sufficient” to cause, or threaten to cause 
serious injury. It emphasized that “the effects of increased imports, as separated and 
distinguished from the effects of other factors, must be examined to determine whether 
the effects of those imports establish a ‘genuine and substantial relationship’ of cause and 
effect between the increased imports and serious injury”.120 The Appellate Body in US-
Lamb Meat adopted this holding. 
The condition of competition is derived from the “under such condition” 
requirement in Article 2.1. Both of the Panels in Korea-Diary and Argentina-Footwear 
found that the phrase of “under such condition” indicates the need to analyze “the 
conditions of competition between the imported product and the domestic like or directly 
competitive products in the importing country's market. It requires national authorities to 
address specifically the nature of the interaction between the imported and domestic 
products in the domestic market of the importing country. It does not necessarily require 
a price analysis per se. The relevance of price must be considered on a case-specific 
basis.121 The Panel in US-Wheat Gluten also had the same view. 
Non-attribution requirement has been a vexing issue for the panels and Appellate 
Body. In Argentina-Footwear, the Panel simply stated that a sufficient consideration of 
“other factors” other than imports and an analysis separating the effects of those “other 
119. Supra note 16, Panel Report, para. 8.138. 
120. Supra note 16, Appellate Report, paras. 67-70. 
121. Supra note 15, Panel Report, para. 252. 
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factors” from the effects of the imports are necessary.122 Later, the Appellate Body in US-
Wheat Gluten deemed it important to “separate or distinguish the effects caused by the 
different factors in bring about the injury” and further developed a three-stage analysis 
for the domestic authority’s causation analysis. First, the effects caused to the domestic 
industry by increased imports are distinguished from those caused by other factors. 
Second, injury caused by all different factors, including increased imports, should be 
attributed to increase imports and other relevant factors respectively. Third, a “genuine 
and substantial relationship” of cause and effect between increased imports and serious 
injury is required.123 In US-Lamb Meat, the Appellate Body clarified the legal status of 
this method and its primary objective. It stressed that “the final determination about the 
existence of ‘the causal link’ between increased imports and serious injury can only be 
made after the effects of increased imports have been properly assessed, and this 
assessment, in turn, follows the separation of the effects caused by all the different causal 
factors”.124 By reference to its ruling in US-Hot Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body in US-
Line Pipe considered Article 4.2(b) of Safeguard Agreement also requires an 
“identification” of “the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the other known 
factors” as well as “a satisfactory explanation of the nature and extent of the injurious 
effects of the other factors, as distinguished from the injurious effects of the increased 
imports”, like Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement. To fulfill this requirement, “the 
competent authorities must establish explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate 
explanation, that injury caused by factors other than increased imports is not attributed to 
increased imports. This explanation must be clear and unambiguous. It must not merely  
122. Ibid., paras. 8.265-8.267. 
123. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, paras. 68-69. 
124. Supra note 17, Appellate Body Report, paras. 178-179. 
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imply or suggest an explanation. It must be a straightforward explanation in express 
terms”.125 
Notwithstanding the clarification that the panels and Appellate Body has made to 
the Safeguard Agreement, it seems to me that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of 
“serious injury” derogates from the text of the agreement itself. According to the 
Appellate Body’s ruling in US-Wheat Gluten and US-Lamb Meat, increased imports 
need not be sufficient to cause serious injury or threat thereof. Rather, there should be a 
“genuine and substantial relationship” of cause and effect between the increased imports 
and serious injury. In contrast with that, Article 4.2(a) of Safeguard Agreement states, “In 
the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening 
to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this Agreement….” 
Article 4.2(b) has the similar language, “…. the existence of the causal link between 
increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof”. The 
literal language in these articles suggest clearly that increased imports must cause serious 
injury or threat thereof, meaning that increased imports alone should be sufficient to 
cause serious injury or threat thereof, even other factors may also contribute to the injury 
of the domestic industry. Moreover, taking into account the objective of the Safeguard 
agreement, we can find inconsistencies as well. As states in the preamble of the 
Safeguard Agreement, the purpose and objective of this agreement is to “clarify and 
reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994…. And to re-establish multilateral control over 
the safeguard…” Safeguard measure is an extraordinary remedy against fair trade 
practice. It can only be applied under emergent situation. However, based on the  
125. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report, paras. 212-217. 
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Appellate Body’s ruling, Members may impose safeguard measures even when increased 
import has a minor impact on domestic industry. It actually loosens the multilateral rule 
of safeguards. Besides, As the Appellate Body explained in the US-Line Pipe, Safeguard 
Agreement deals only with imports, such that safeguard measures should be applied so as 
to address only the consequences of imports.126 As such, safeguard measure should be 
targeted at the serious injury or threat thereof by increased imports rather than injurious 
effects caused by other factors. Therefore, it is necessary for increased imports to be 
sufficient to cause injury and threat thereof for the application of safeguard measures. 
Lastly, even though the Appellate Body’s ruling is reasonable, it seems not practical for 
its lacking of clear standard. What is “genuine and substantial relationship”? How to 
evaluate it? The Appellate Body has never elaborated this concept since it was raised. If 
Appellate Body still sticks to this ruling in the future, a practical standard should be 
developed. In this case, the standard applied by USITC in the domestic investigation 
seems plausible. This standard requires increased imports to be “substantial cause, which 
is important and not less than any other causes”. If the competent authority can 
distinguish and separate the effects caused by increased imports and other factors, and 
provides adequate and reasoned explanation and assessment, this standard and the 
competent authority’s determination may meet the Appellate Body’s requirement. 
Another critical question is how one disaggregates causes. As John H. Jackson 
pointed out, if a general economic recession takes place at the same time with the import 
increase, it will be very difficult for the effects of increased imports to surpass the effect 
of the economic recession as a whole; yet, if the effect of general economic recession has  
126. Supra note 10, p.190. 
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been disaggregated into many factors, increased imports may be a “substantial cause” for 
the injury.127 Since the method applied by the Members to separate the effects of 
increased imports and other factors is not specified in the Safeguard Agreement, 
Members thereby have the discretion to adopt their own methods. This situation will add 
to the instability of the safeguard system. 
The Appellate Body in US-Lamb Meat stated that the three-step approach 
developed in US-Wheat Gluten is not legal "tests" mandated by the text of the Safeguard 
Agreement. Instead, these steps leave unanswered many methodological questions 
relating to the non-attribution requirement found in the second sentence of Article 4.2(b). 
Is it sound for national authorities, panels and Appellate Body to apply a test that is not 
based on the text of the Agreement, let alone a test of little feasibility?  
 
V.2.8 Selectivity 
Selectivity has been a long-time troublesome and controversial issue in the 
evolution and reform of the GATT and WTO safeguard system. During the Tokyo Round, 
the GATT Contracting Parties discussed extensively on this issue. Due to EC’s 
persistence, Parties failed to make a compromise on this issue. Later, WTO Members 
eventually succeeded in bringing about a new agreement, Safeguard Agreement, 
generally in favor of non-discrimination, but with some flexibility and certain preferential 
treatment for developing countries. Article 2.2 stipulates that the safeguard measure shall 
be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its origin, that is, non-
discrimination application. The footnote thereof offers two options for a customs union to  
127. Supra note 18, Appellate Report, para. 258. 
 - 59 - 
impose safeguard measures. By contrast, Article 5.2(b) and Article 9 set forth certain 
selective application in specific circumstances. 128 
The approach the panels and Appellate Body adopted to resolve this issue is 
“parallelism”. The Panel in Argentina-Footwear considered that a “parallelism” between 
the scope of the investigation and the scope of the applied measure is required under 
Article 2.1 and 2.2. The Appellate Body affirmed that safeguard measures taking imports 
from all sources into investigation could only be applied on imports from all sources.129 
Later in US-Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body affirmed the principle of “parallelism” by 
recognizing the phrase of “being…. being imported” in Article 2.1 and 2.2 have the same 
meaning. It pointed out that including certain products in investigation but excluding 
them from application would give different meaning to the phrase aforementioned. The 
USITC improperly excluded the imports from Canada from application by merely finding 
the imports from Canada did not contribute importantly to the serious injury caused by 
imports. For justifying its practice, USITC should have demonstrated explicit finding that 
all imports other than those from Canada cause or threaten to cause serious injury.130 In 
US-Line Pipe, the Appellate Body further clarified the standard to establish a prima facie 
case of a violation of the “parallelism” requirement. If a gap between the imports covered 
under the investigation and imports falling within the scope of the measure can be 
demonstrated, a prima facie case of the absence of the “parallelism” of safeguard measure 
is established.131 
128. Article 5.2(b) allows Members not to allocate the quota based on a historical formula, 
provided that they demonstrate disproportionate import increase from particular 
Members for a application of safeguard measure no longer than 4 years and the 
condition of departure from Article 2.2 is equitable to all relevant suppliers. In 
addition, Article 9 provides the de minimis exemption for the imports from 
developing countries. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
129. Supra note 15, Panel Report, paras. 84-87; and Appellate Body Report, para. 113. 
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The complainant in Argentina-Footwear invoked footnote 1 of Safeguard 
Agreement Article 2.1 to defend its selective safeguard measure. In Appellate Body’s 
view, “the footnote only applies when a customs union applies a safeguard measure as ‘a 
single unit or on behalf of a member State’”. In this case, the safeguard measure was 
applied by Argentina instead of MERCOSUR. Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded 
that footnote 1 does not apply to this case.132 This ruling clarify the situation that footnote 1 
applies to.  
One case involved the issue of the selective safeguard measure allowed by the 
Safeguard Agreement under Article 9. Article 9 allows the imports from a developing 
country to be exempted from safeguard measure as long as its share of imports of the 
product concerned in the importing Member does not exceed 3 per cent, provided that 
developing country Member with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account 
for not more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned. This clause gives 
developing countries special and differential treatment, which might be a reward from 
developed countries for developing countries to accept the Uruguay Round Safeguard 
Agreement. But, theoretically, developed countries may well use this clause to block the 
imports from developing countries. In US-Line Pipe, by setting certain tariff quota 
applied to all non-NAFTA Members without exemption to developing countries allowed 
under Article 9, the US’s practice was found to be in violation of Article 9. The USITC 
argued that developing countries were actually exempted from the measure because the 
level of the tariff quota exemption was consummated with the 3 per cent de minimis level. 
However, the Appellate Body found it only represents 2.7 per cent of total imports and  
130. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, paras. 96-98. 
131. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report, paras. 186-187. 
132. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras. 106-108. 
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thereby rejected USITC’s argument.133 In addition to problems arising in the application, 
loopholes existed in the text of Article 9 itself. Suppose total imports of certain product 
only accounts for 10% of the domestic market share of a Member, and only 1 per cent of 
the domestic market occupied by imports from developing countries, with 0.2 per cent 
from Members A, B, C, D and E respectively. Thus, even though the individual market 
share of A, B, C, D, E is 0.2 per cent and the individual import share is 2 per cent, the 
importing Member still can impose safeguard measure against the imports from these 
developing Member countries, in that their collective imports accounts for 10 % of the 
total imports, exceeding the threshold of 9%. In fact, both the market share and import 
share of the imports from developing countries are very small and may be of little market 
influence, yet they are still subject to the safeguard measure. In principle, safeguard is 
based on the relationship between increased imports and domestic industry, and is to 
remedy the injury suffered by domestic industry. As such, it may be more justifiable to 
change the indicator of reference to the market share of the product imported. 
 
V.2.9 Necessary Extent of Application 
With a view to minimizing the welfare loss resulting from the application of 
safeguard measures, Safeguard Agreement Article 5.1 sets out the necessary extent of 
application. It states:  
“A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a quantitative restriction 
is used, such a measure shall not reduce the quantity of imports below the level of a  
133. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report, paras. 125-133. 
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recent period which shall be the average of imports in the last three representative years 
for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury. Members should choose measures most 
suitable for the achievement of these objectives”.134 
Three issues were raised before the panels and Appellate Body, namely, express 
justification at time of application, permissible extent of measures and the requirement of 
adjustment. Here I will discuss the first two issues, while leave the issue of adjustment 
for later discussion. 
Regarding the issue of express justification, In Korea-Diary, the Panel considered 
that Article 5.1 mandates Members applying safeguard measure to provide a reasoned 
explanation for the necessary extent of the measure. Appellate Body rejected this 
interpretation and held that the first sentence of Article 5.1 does not establish a general 
procedural obligation to demonstrate compliance with Article 5.1 at the time of 
application, in that first sentence does not contain an express statement for a “clear 
justification” like the second sentence does. The Panel and Appellate Body in US-Line 
Pipe had the same consideration.135  
As for the substantive requirement of permissible extent of measure, in Korea-
Diary, the Panel held and the Appellate Body agreed that the first sentence of Article 5.1 
imposes an obligation on a Member applying a safeguard measure “to ensure that the 
measure applied is commensurate with the goals of preventing or remedying serious 
injury and of facilitating adjustment, regardless of the particular form that a safeguard  
134. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
135. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.99, Appellate Body Report, para. 96; and supra 
note 18, Panel Report paras. 7.80-7.81, Appellate Body Report, paras. 228-235. 
 - 63 - 
measure might take”.136 The Appellate Body in US-Line Pipe further elaborated this 
substantive obligation that “safeguard measures may be applied only to the extent that 
they address serious injury attributed to increased imports”.137 On top of this elaboration, 
the Appellate Body found that Korea had established a prima facie case that the measure 
applied by USITC was not limited to the extent necessary under Article 5.1, in that the 
USITC had violated the non-attribution requirement under Article 4.2(b) and did not 
rebut the prima facie case. Further, the Appellate Body made clear that a violation of the 
non-attribution requirement under Article 4.2(b) does not mean an automatic violation of 
first sentence of Article 5.1, unless the complainant fails to rebut the prima facie case. 
There are some problems in Appellate Body’s interpretation of the first sentence 
of Article 5.1. It seems that the Appellate Body faced the dilemma of making choice 
between tightening and relaxing the discipline. According to the standard of review set 
forth by the Appellate Body, a Member applying safeguard measure is obligated to 
provide adequate, reasoned and reasonable explanation for the findings and determination 
made. As a result, express justification for why the extent of measure is necessary and 
least trade restrictive is needed. Furthermore, since safeguard is extraordinary remedy 
against fair trade practice and the objective of Safeguard Agreement is to reinforce the 
discipline, it may be appropriate to tighten the discipline and thereby require express 
justification from Members for demonstration of adequate, reasoned and reasonable 
explanation. To the contrary, in order to avoid giving Members too much burden and 
encourage the use of safeguard instead of ERAs and other unilateral trade protective 
measures, it seems better to release the Members from the burden of justification of the  
136. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.99, Appellate Body Report, para. 96. 
137. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report para. 260. 
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necessary extent of the measure, since the justification requires complicated economic 
analysis and thereby burdensome. In the cases at hand, it seems to me that the Appellate 
Body chose to relax the discipline and encourage the use of safeguard. 
Though the Appellate Body has ruled that the measure should be applied only to 
the extent necessary to remedy or prevent serious injury caused by increased imports, 
how to apply this standard is still unclear. It is even more difficult to determine or 
examine whether this standard is met without the demonstration of adequate, reasoned 
and reasonable explanation from the Member applying the safeguard measure. 
The period of reference in the determination of the level of quantitative restriction 
has not been touched in the dispute. However, it does not mean that the text is clear 
enough. Rather, the implication of the phrase of “the last three representative years” is 
vague in its nature. What is representative year? How to select the last three 
representative years? The text per se does not give any instruction and thereby leaves 
Members great discretion to have their own approaches. These questions need further 
clarifications in future decisions from Appellate Body. 
 
V.2.10 Notification and Consultation 
The incorporation of the notification and consultation requirement into the 
Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement results from the Members’ requests of improving 
transparency and enhancing surveillance of the safeguard system. Article 12 provides:138 
“1. A Member shall immediately notify the Committee on Safeguards upon:  
(a) initiating an investigatory process relating to serious injury or threat thereof 
and the reasons for it; 
138. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
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(b) making a finding of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased 
imports; and 
(c) taking a decision to apply or extend a safeguard measure. 
2. In making the notifications referred to in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c), the Member 
proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide the Committee on 
Safeguards with all pertinent information, which shall include evidence of serious injury 
or threat thereof caused by increased imports, precise description of the product involved 
and the proposed measure, proposed date of introduction, expected duration and 
timetable for progressive liberalization. In the case of an extension of a measure, 
evidence that the industry concerned is adjusting shall also be provided. The Council for 
Trade in Goods or the Committee on Safeguards may request such additional information 
as they may consider necessary from the Member proposing to apply or extend the 
measure. 
3. A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide 
adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial 
interest as exporters of the product concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing the 
information provided under paragraph 2, exchanging views on the measure and reaching 
an understanding on ways to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1 of Article 8. 
4. A Member shall make a notification to the Committee on Safeguards before 
taking a provisional safeguard measure referred to in Article 6. Consultations shall be 
initiated immediately after the measure is taken.” 
According to the Panel in Korea-Diary, Article 12 states five notifications in the 
course of safeguard investigation and application. Three are under Article 12.1, namely, 
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notification of initiation, notification of finding of serious injury and threat thereof, and 
notification of taking decision of application or extension. The fourth is notification of 
proposal of safeguard measures under Article 12.3. Last is notification of provisional 
measures under Article 12.4. 
Three issues, i.e., contents, timing of negotiation and adequacy of consultation, 
were discussed by panels and Appellate Body. 
The contents of notification is set out in Article 12.2, which requires Members 
applying safeguard measures to provide “all pertinent information”. How to interpret this 
standard was at issue in Korea-Diary case. There, the complainant argued all the 
information under Article 3 and 4 should be notified. Both the Panel and Appellate Body 
rejected its view. The Panel then rendered the “all pertinent information” as a 
requirement that “the amount of information notified must be sufficient to be useful to 
Members with a substantial interest in the proposed safeguard measure”.139 The Appellate 
Body differed from the Panel in the interpretation. It considered the “all pertinent 
information” standard constitutes “a minimum notification requirement that must be met 
if a notification is to comply with the requirements of Article 12”. “a Member must, at a 
minimum, address in its notifications, pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article 12, 
all the items specified in Article 12.2 as constituting ‘all pertinent information’, as well as 
the factors listed in Article 4.2 that are required to be evaluated in a safeguards 
investigation.”140 It is still not clear that how far the injury factors in Article 4.2(b) should 
be addressed. Future Appellate Body decision will be helpful to the clarification of this 
issue. 
139. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.127. 
140. Supra note 14, Appellate Body Report, paras. 107-108. 
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The delays in notification have been a long-time troublesome problem in the 
investigation and application of safeguard measures. Article 12.1 sets out an “immediate 
notification” requirement for a Member applying safeguard measure. The Appellate Body 
in US-Wheat Gluten considered that “immediately” implies “a certain urgency”, the 
degree of which deviates case-by-case depending on the administrative difficulties and 
the character of the information supplied.141 However, “the amount of time taken to 
prepare the notification must, in all cases, be kept to a minimum”. The Appellate Body 
further considered that “immediate” notification allows the Committee on Safeguards, 
and Members, the fullest possible period to reflect upon and react to an ongoing 
safeguard investigation”. Whether a Member meets this requirement neither depends on 
evidence as to how the Committee and Members use that notification, nor an ex post 
facto assessment of whether Members suffered actual prejudice through an insufficiency 
in the notification period.142 In explaining the notification obligation under Article 
12.1(c), the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s interpretation that a notification under 
Article 12.1(c) must be made before implementation of the “proposed” safeguard 
measure, holding instead the “immediate notification” requirement governs solely the 
timing of notification. They clarified that the triggering event for Article 12.1(c) 
notification is the “taking” of a decision, while not “coming into effect” of the 
decision.143 
The Appellate Body in US-Wheat Gluten also considered the issue of “adequacy 
consultation”. They held that sufficient time and sufficiently detailed information on the  
141. As the Panels in Korea-Diary recognized, relevant factors in this regard may include 
the complexity of the notification and the need for translation into one of the WTO's 
official languages. See supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 7.128. 
142. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, paras. 105-106. 
143. Ibid, paras. 120-122. 
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form of the proposed measure needed to enable meaningful consultations to occur, 
including the nature of the remedy, must be provided in advance of the consultations.144 
In US-Line Pipe, the Appellate Body followed this approach. However, they further 
noted that the proposed measure setting the foundation for consultation is not necessarily 
identical to the one eventually applied. In this particular case, since the proposed measure 
and applied measure “differed substantially”, the Appellate Body doubted the 
meaningfulness of the consultation and moved to examine whether the notification of US 
met the previously mentioned criteria. Recognizing that a finding on the adequacy of time 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the Appellate Body found that US failed to 
provide adequate time for Korea to prepare for consultation and thereby acted 
inconsistently with Article 12.3.145 Yet, the Appellate Body did not put forward a 
standard for assessing the time necessary for preparing for consultations. Then, how 
much time is adequate, how to evaluate the necessary time? Practical standard needs to 
be developed by Appellate Body in the future dispute. 
Based on the reasoning under Article 12.3, the Appellate Body in both US-Wheat 
Gluten and US-Line Pipe also ruled that US acted inconsistently with Article 12.3, in that 
a Member cannot “endeavor to maintain” an adequate balance of concessions unless it 
has provided an adequate opportunity for prior consultations on a proposed measure.146 
 Another problem in respect to the dispute of notification obligation under Article 
12 is how to remedy the nullified or impaired benefits accruing under the WTO 
Agreement. Suppose a Member applying a safeguard measure does nothing wrong but  
144. Ibid, paras. 136-137. 
145. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report, paras. 104-113. 
146. Supra note 16, Appellate Body Report, footnote 39, para. 146; and supra note 18, 
Appellate Body Report, paras. 118-119. 
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delays in notifying the Safeguard Committee, and thereby nullifies the benefits of the 
exporting Members. How to remedy this inconsistency? As usual, the Panel will just 
recommend the Member applying safeguard measure to bring its measure into 
consistency with the Safeguard Agreement. But how? Shall the Member make 
notification the second time, or provide compensation? Is it reasonable or sound?  
The delay in notification of the safeguard measure caused problem to the integrity 
of the safeguard system. In both US-Wheat Gluten and US-Line Pipe, the US failed to 
make timely notification in most the circumstances. The delay may not result from 
administrative difficulties or the characters of the information. Rather, some may result 
from the facts that the Member applying the safeguard measure does not act in a “good 
faith”. As the Appellate Body pointed out in US-Line Pipe, “the US appears to have 
recognized the need for adequate time to prepare for the consultations”. However, the US 
failed to provide adequate opportunity to have a meaningful consultation with Korea. 
 
V.3. Remaining Issues 
V.3.1 GATT Article XXIV as Defense to Non-Discrimination Application of 
Safeguards 
The relationship between GATT Article XXIV and the Safeguard Agreement has 
troubled Members for a long time and still remained unclear. The problem can be traced 
back to the GATT period, where the Contracting Parties discussed on a number of 
occasions the modalities of application of Article XIX in relation to agreement under 
Article XXIV, in particular Article XXIV:8. The focus of the debate is whether a member 
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of regional trading arrangement (RTA) can be exempted from the application of 
safeguard measures initiated by another member of the same RTA. 
GATT Article XXIV:8 provides: 147 
“(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all 
the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to 
substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and, (ii) subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not 
included in the union; 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories.” 
In addition, the last sentence of the footnote to Article 2.1 of Safeguard 
Agreement states:148 
“Nothing in the [Safeguards] Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the 
relationship between Article XIX and paragraph 8 of the Article XXIV of GATT 1994.” 
In the dispute under the WTO DSB, GATT Article XXIV and the last sentence of  
147. WTO, GATT 1994. 
148. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
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the footnote to Article 2.1 of Safeguard Agreement were invoked by Argentina and the 
US to defend their selective non-application of safeguard measure to RTA members. In 
Argentina-Footwear, by examining the meaning of Article XXIV:8 and the practice, the 
Panel found that GATT Article XXIV:8 does not preclude Argentina from the obligation 
of non-discrimination application of safeguard measure.149 Appellate Body found the 
Panel analysis in err. In their view, footnote 1 to Article 2.1 of Safeguard Agreement does 
not apply in the case at hand, in that it is Argentina imposed the safeguard measure 
instead of MERCOSUR as a custom union. Referring to Turkey–Textile150 and the fact 
that Argentina did not raised GATT Article XXIV as a defense, the Appellate Body 
considered the Panel’s analysis under GATT Article XXIV was irrelevant in this case, and 
then reversed the Panel’s legal findings and conclusion.151 In US-Wheat Gluten, the Panel 
and Appellate Body also found that GATT Article XXIV irrelevant with the situation at 
issue.  
Later in US-Line Pipe, Korea argued that the US violate the MFN principle under 
GATT Article I, XIII:1, XIX and Safeguard Agreement 2.2 by excluding Canada and 
Mexico from the safeguard measure. According to the Panel, the line pipe measure 
imposed by the US constituted a “duty or other restrictive regulation of commerce” 
within the meaning of Article XXIV:8(b). It was in principle authorized by Article XXIV,  
149. Supra note 15, Panel Report, paras. 8.93-8.100. 
150. According to the Appellate Body Report, “Article XXIV may justify a measure 
which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions.… that this defense is 
available only when it is demonstrated by the Member imposing the measure that 
"the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully 
meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV” and “that 
the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to 
introduce the measure at issue.” See Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R, 
adopted 19 November 1999, para. 58. 
151. Supra note 15, Appellate Body Report, paras. 108-110. 
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provided it met certain conditions thereof, i.e., NAFTA must (1) comply with Article 
XXIV:5(b) and (c), and (2) eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
on “substantially all” intra-NAFTA trade. Applying the approach in this case, the Panel 
found that the US is “entitled to rely on an Article XXIV defense against Korea’s claims 
under Articles I, XIII and XIX regarding the exclusion of imports from Canada and 
Mexico from the scope of the line pipe measure”.152 With respect to Article 2.2 of the 
Safeguard Agreement, the Panel called that the Appellate Body in Turkey-Textile, which 
stated the measure justified under Article XXIV must be necessary for the formation of a 
regional trade agreement.153 In this case, the Panel found that the measure forms a part of 
the elimination of “duty or other restrictive regulation of commerce” and thereby needed 
no more demonstration. Moreover, considering safeguard measures under Safeguard 
Agreement are also GATT XIX measures that are not stated as exemption under Article 
XXIV:8, the Panel ruled that GATT Article XXIV provides as a defense against non-
discrimination application under Article 2.2 of the Safeguards Agreement.154 On appeal, 
the Appellate Body declined to rule on this appeal. Rather than making a ruling on the 
relationship between GATT Article XXIV, it clarified the situation where GATT Article 
XXIV becomes relevant to the safeguard measure. It stated there are only two possible 
circumstances, where the principle of “parallelism” was met. One is when imports 
excluded in the investigation are also excluded from the measure, or, if not, reasoned and 
adequate justification showing imports from non-RTA-members alone satisfies the 
condition of application is provided. Finding neither of the two circumstances applies in 
this case, the Appellate Body rejected to rule on the appeal and considered the Panel’s  
152. Supra note 18, Panel Report, paras 7.141-7.146. 
153. See supra note 141. 
154. Supra note 18, Panel Report, paras 7.147-7.158. 
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finding “moot and having no legal effect”.155  
This ruling leaves the problem of the availability of the GATT Article XXIV 
defense to non-discrimination application of safeguard measure unanswered. If either of 
the two circumstances supposed by the Appellate Body is met, how will the Panel and 
Appellate Body make the ruling? Should GATT Article XXIV defense be available?  
Nevertheless, as the safeguard measure takes the form of tariff or quantitative 
restriction, both fall within the scope of “duty or other restrictive regulation of 
commerce” within the meaning of Article XXIV:8(b). Moreover, GATT Article XIX is 
not listed as exemption in GATT Article XXIV. In this regard, it seems plausible to allow 
Article XXIV defense, provided certain conditions are met. Especially, it should be 
provided expressly that the defense cannot be applied to the RTAs under the formation. 
In other words, the RTAs qualified to apply the defense should fully comply with the 
requirement stated in Article XXIV:5 and 8. Otherwise, Members can easily apply 
selective safeguard measures in the name of forming a RTA. 
Based on the Appellate Body ruling in Turkey-Textile, one prerequisite for the 
justification by Article XXIV of inconsistencies with WTO obligation is that the custom 
union or FTAs must fully meet the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of 
Article XXIV. However, since there has been no RTA qualified by the Committee on 
Regional Trading Agreement (CRTA) to date, it is impossible for Members to make 
effective defense in this regard, and the defense is meaningless. Given the feeble nature 
of WTO’s surveillance on RTAs, allowing Article XXIV defense may cause turbulence 
to the world trading system. The urgent matter is to strengthen the surveillance of the 
CRTA. 
155. Supra note 18, Appellate Body Report, paras. 198-199. 
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Another problem is the jurisdiction of WTO. Does WTO have the jurisdiction 
over RTAs? At first view, since RTAs are subject to Article XXIV of GATT 1994, it 
seems that WTO has jurisdiction over RTAs. But, WTO Agreement applies to its 
Members. To date, only EC as a custom union is a Member of WTO. Therefore, if EC as 
a whole impose a safeguard measure, WTO has the jurisdiction to evaluate its legitimacy. 
What if NAFTA as a whole takes a safeguard action? Can WTO make any ruling on it?  
 
V.3.2 Structural Adjustment 
“Perhaps the most important feature of the Safeguard Agreement, at least in 
concept, is the link between the objective of preventing or remedying serious injury and 
the objective of facilitating adjustment by the domestic industry”.156 It is expressly 
stipulated in Article 5.1. To push ahead with the domestic adjustment of the injured 
industry, Article 7 further states:157 
…. 
2. The period mentioned in paragraph 1 may be extended provided that…. that the 
safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that 
there is evidence that the industry is adjusting…. 
…. 
4. In order to facilitate adjustment in a situation where the expected duration of a 
safeguard measure as notified under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 12 is over 
one year, the Member applying the measure shall progressively liberalize it at regular 
intervals during the period of application. 
156. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p.92. 
157. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
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…. 
However, the adjustment requirement has been ignored by GATT Contracting 
Parties and WTO Members through the GATT and WTO history. The issue of adjustment 
was once raised but lightly touched on in the dispute settlement. In Korea-Diary, EC 
argued that Korea erred by omitting to give any consideration to adjustment plans. The 
Panel found no specific provision in the Safeguard Agreement requires an adjustment 
plan. Rather, “the question of adjustment, along with the question of preventing or 
remedying serious injury, must be a part of the authorities’ reasoned explanation of the 
measure it has chosen to apply. Nonetheless, the examination of an adjustment plan, 
within the context of the application of a safeguard measure, would be strong evidence 
that the authorities considered whether the measure was commensurate with the objective 
of preventing or remedying serious injury and facilitating adjustment”.158 
Since this ruling was made, no more complaint regarding the issue of adjustment 
has been brought to the DSB. Therefore, no more judicial clarification and requirements 
were developed by the Appellate Body. The Panel did not provide explicit reason for its 
ruling, while just asserted there was no such requirement. It seems that the Panel failed to 
apply its standard of review in this regard. Is it reliable for this ruling? 
Safeguard measures are extraordinary remedies to be taken only in emergent 
situations. They are temporal remedies that are imposed in the form of import restrictions 
in the absence of any allegation of an unfair trade practice, with a view to alleviating the 
injury of domestic industry. One important rationale justifying the existence of safeguard 
shows the safeguard mechanism is developed for the purpose of structural adjustment,  
158. Supra note 14, Panel Report, para. 108.  
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including restoring competitiveness and facilitating orderly contraction. In my view, both 
the rationale and the nature of safeguard suggest a requirement of an adjustment plan for 
application of safeguard measures. Furthermore, as what we have discussed before, 
Appellate Body holds that every word in the WTO Agreement should be given the 
meaning. Therefore, the phrase of “to facilitate adjustment”, which has been a dead letter 
since its coming into being, also binds WTO Members and should be given the meaning. 
How to facilitate adjustment in the term of safeguard measure should be demonstrated, as 
the requirement the Appellate Body put on the Members to demonstrate “unforeseen 
development” before application. 
To the contrary, problems may occur due to this requirement. Reviewing the 
negotiating history, we can find that the mandatory language in the original 1989 Draft of 
Safeguard Agreement was erased later, for Members worried that any mandatory 
language would encourage heavy government involvement in industry’s retrenching.159 
Nevertheless, import-competing industries may be less likely to self-adjust. As discussed 
in Part IV, among the 16 safeguard cases filed to the DSB, 3 involved the US’s steel 
industry. It shows the industries under safeguard protection tend to be reluctant to self-
adjust, especially those political powerful traditional industries in the developed countries. 
In order to propel the adjustment forward, adjustment plan may be more effective. 
In addition to Article 7.1, Article 7.2 also incorporates the notion of “adjustment” 
into its text. However, under this Article, Members may easily extend the safeguard 
measures if there is evidence that the industry is adjusting, no matter how much has been 
adjusted, provided other requirements are met. Besides, how to evaluate the level of  
159. See Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 
(1986-1992), vol. 2: Commentary, Table 6, p.1791, Boston: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation publishers, 1993. 
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adjustment? What policy instrument can be applied for adjustment? How long should the 
adjustment period be? All the questions will remain unclear until the Appellate Body 
makes the judicial clarification. 
To “facilitate adjustment”, it may be useful to further enhance the multilateral 
surveillance of the safeguard measure. If Members are obligated to check the progress of 
adjustment during the interim review and its result will greatly affect the future 
effectiveness of the safeguard measure, the “structural adjustment” requirement may be 
better implemented by Members. 
 
V.3.3 Procedural defect of Dispute Settlement of Safeguard Measures 
Dispute settlement system is the major pillar of the multilateral trading system 
and a unique contribution of the WTO to the stability of the global economy. All the 
disputes arising under the covered agreement of WTO Agreement are subject to the 
“Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” (DSU). 
Safeguard Agreement is not an exception. Article 14 thereof obligates Members to resort 
to DSU for dispute settlement, which states:160 
“The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and 
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the 
settlement of disputes arising under this Agreement.” 
However, the normal dispute settlement procedure seems too dilatory for dispute 
regarding safeguard measures. According to the DSU, the standard dispute settlement 
procedure takes about one year and three months, starting from consultation and ending  
160. See WTO, Safeguard Agreement, 1994. 
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at the adoption of the Appellate Body report. If disputing parties have disagreement as to 
the reasonable period of time of implementation, they shall resort to arbitration. The 
reasonable period of time of implementation decided thereby can be 15 months after the 
adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report at the most. If the parties still question 
consistency with the measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, 
such dispute shall be decided through recourse to arbitration. Thus, additional three-
month time is needed for the decision. In practice, the whole procedure dragged on for 
much longer period of time. 
Reviewing the procedure of the dispute settlement of all the 6 cases addressed, we 
can see that it took the panel and Appellate Body much longer time. (See Table 6) In case 
of Korea-diary, the DSB took the time twice as stipulated in the DSU, say, 24 months and 
4 days calculating from the date of panel request to the date of the adoption of the 
Appellate Body report. Even the quickest proceeding, the dispute settlement of 
Argentina-Footwear, took more than 17 months for the same procedure. Ironically, the 
expiry date of implementation in that case coincided the proposed expiry date of 
safeguard measure. Also, the implementation period in US-Wheat Gluten expired one 
day later than the proposed expiry date of the safeguard measure. What’s more, in Chile-
Agricultural Products, the whole panel and Appellate proceeding started after the 
expiration of the safeguard measure. It is ridiculous for those Members to bring the case 
before the DSB and then spend tremendous amount of money and time to win the case, 
but eventually get nothing. As such, the dispute settlement procedure regarding the 
safeguard measure is questionable. 
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Table 6: Timeline of the Safeguard Measures and the Dispute Settlement 
 
 
Timeline of Dispute Settlement Timeline of Measure 
Dispute Dispute Number Panel Request 
(A) 
Panel 
Report 
Circulated 
AB 
Report 
Adopted 
(B) 
Duration 
(From A to 
B) 
Expiration of 
Implementation 
Date of 
Application 
Date of 
Termination Duration 
Korea - 
Dairy WT/DS/98 
9 Jan.  
1998 
21 Jun. 
1999 
12 Jan. 
2000 
24 months 
 + 4 days 20 May 2000 1 Mar. 1997 28 Feb. 2001 3 Years 
Argentina -
Footwear WT/DS/121 
10 Jun. 
1998 
25 Jun. 
1999 
12 Jan. 
2000 
17 months 
+ 3 days 25 Feb. 2000 25 Feb. 1997 25 Feb. 2000 
3 Years 
+1 Day 
US- 
Wheat Gluten WT/DS/166 
3 Jun.  
1999 
31 Jul.  
2000 
19 Jan. 
2001 
17 months  
+ 17 days 2 June 2001 1 Jun. 1998 1 Jun. 2001 
3 Years 
+1 Day 
US - 
Lamb Meat 
WT/DS/177, 
178 
14 Oct. 
1999 
21Dec. 
2000 
16 May 
2001 
17 months 
 + 3 days 15 Nov. 2001 22 Jul. 1999 22 Jul. 2002 
3 Years 
+1 Day 
US - 
Line Pipe WT/DS/202 
14 Sep. 
2000 
29 Oct. 
2001 
8 Mar. 
2002 
17 months  
+ 23 days N/A 23 Feb. 2000 24 Feb. 2003 
3 Years 
+2 Day 
Chile -
Agriculture 
Products 
WT/DS/207 19 Jan. 2001 
3 May 
2002 
23 Oct. 
2002 
21 months  
+ 5days N/A 26 Nov. 1999 26 Nov. 2000 
1 Year 
+1 Day 
Argentina- 
Peaches WT/DS/238 
6 Dec. 
2001 
14 Feb. 
2003 - - - - - - 
 
Source: WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/9, 29 October 2002
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Since safeguard is an extraordinary remedy against fair trade practice, in order to 
minimize the loss it brought about to those exporters doing nothing wrong, and to inhibit 
Members from abusing the safeguard mechanism, it may be appropriate for DSB to 
expedite the dispute settlement procedure. In this regard, a fast-track procedure 
specifically addressing the safeguard dispute, like the special dispute settlement system 
provided to remedy the impairment caused by the prohibited subsidy, may help to resolve 
the procedural defect. 
 
V.3.4 Tighten or Relax? 
As described above, safeguard serves the key function of regulating a trade-off 
between trade liberalization ex ante and opportunities to impose protection ex post. For 
one thing, safeguard is an effective multilateral mechanism to push forward trade 
liberalization. It calls for MFN application and is based on the general equilibrium of 
rights and obligations. Therefore, compared with other contingent protection measures, 
such as ERAs and antidumping measures, which are deemed to be lack of economic 
sense, safeguard is more friendly to the stability of development of multilateral trading 
system. In this sense, its application shall be encouraged. For another thing, it is a trade 
restrictive measure against fair trade practice and undermines the social welfare. The 
unclear obligations under the current rules exacerbated the confusion and encouraged 
abuse among Members, thereby impair the integrity of the multilateral trading system. 
Hence, it should be seriously disciplined and restricted. The trade-off is reflected in the 
Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement as well as the dispute settlement practice on 
safeguard measures. 
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Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement is a successful compromise between these 
two different directions. Compared with GATT Article XIX, it provides more incentives 
and guidelines for Members to invoke safeguard while prohibits ERAs. On the other hand, 
it also calls for reinforcement of the disciplines and re-establishment of the multilateral 
control of the safeguard action. Examining the text, in general, the agreement seems a 
little bit tilted to the direction of strengthening the discipline.  
As the negotiators in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiation, the WTO Panel 
and Appellate Body also face a dilemma of making choice between further strengthening 
the multilateral discipline over safeguard action and providing incentives for the adoption 
of safeguard. We can find the track in the discussion of various issues in the dispute. On 
some issues, the Appellate Body put many obligations and burdens on Members, like the 
requirement of demonstration of “unforeseen development”, application of GATT Article 
XIII and XIX, all relevant factors examined in the determination of serious injury, though 
they may not be necessary in my view. On some other issue, the Appellate Body’s ruling 
put a lower level of obligation for Members to impose safeguard, such as the 
interpretation of serious injury and threat thereof, the requirement of causation and non-
attribution, and necessary extent of measures.  
Generally speaking, it seems to me that the Appellate Body has been vacillating 
between these two directions. On the one hand, they have been trying to interpret the 
Safeguard Agreement in the stricter way. At the same time, they have been trying to 
make the judicial clarification on the ambiguities existing in the Agreement, with a view 
to improving the practicality of the measure and thereby providing some incentives for 
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Members to apply the measure. Evidently, it is difficult to hold the helm while keep the 
wheel rolling. 
 
VI. Concerns on The Transitional Product-specific Safeguard 
Mechanism towards China in Relation to Dispute Settlement 
 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 was at the price of a selective safeguard 
clause, which is stated in Part I:16 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter “the Protocol”, See Appendix 4). 
The Protocol provides for a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism. In 
fact, this special safeguard mechanism provides for an outright derogation from the basic 
principle of the WTO as well as of Safeguard Agreement. It is featured by the specificity 
of product source, no compensation and procedural requirement, lower criteria for 
application than normal safeguard measure, and bilateral settlement. These will bring 
about new challenges to the global safeguard system and its dispute settlement. 
The transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism permits Members to apply 
safeguard measure specifically against the product from China in the existence of market 
disruption, deviating from the MFN-application principle of Safeguard Agreement. Part 
I:16 of the Protocol provides:161 
“1. In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the territory 
of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products, the WTO Member so affected may request consultations with 
China with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the  
161. See WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 2001 
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affected WTO Member should pursue application of a measure under the Agreement on 
Safeguards. Any such request shall be notified immediately to the Committee on 
Safeguards. 
2. If, in the course of these bilateral consultations, it is agreed that imports of 
Chinese origin are such a cause and that action is necessary, China shall take such action 
as to prevent or remedy the market disruption.  Any such action shall be notified 
immediately to the Committee on Safeguards. 
3. If consultations do not lead to an agreement between China and the WTO 
Member concerned within 60 days of the receipt of a request for consultations, the WTO 
Member affected shall be free, in respect of such products, to withdraw concessions or 
otherwise to limit imports only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such market 
disruption. Any such action shall be notified immediately to the Committee on 
Safeguards. 
4. Market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or directly 
competitive with an article produced by the domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, 
either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat 
of material injury to the domestic industry.  In determining if market disruption exists, the 
affected WTO Member shall consider objective factors, including the volume of imports, 
the effect of imports on prices for like or directly competitive articles, and the effect of 
such imports on the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.” 
…… 
First of all, the Protocol does not mention anything about Safeguard Agreement. 
In consideration of the negotiating history, the reference to the Safeguard Agreement as a 
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sort of residual normative framework in the early draft was removed from the definitive 
resolution.162 Does it mean that the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism is 
not subject to the Safeguard Agreement? 
Here in this Protocol, the “serious injury” requirement in the Safeguard 
Agreement is changed to “market disruption”. Part I:16.4 confines the market disruption 
to the importing competing industry, where the imports increase either relatively or 
absolutely, as a significant cause of material injury or threat thereof. As understood, the 
requirement of “material injury”, which is the same as the injury requirement under the 
Antidumping Agreement, provides for a lower threshold than “serious injury”. But the 
transitional product-specific safeguard measure only requires increasing imports as 
“significant cause of material injury or threat thereof”. Surprisingly, as an extraordinary 
remedy against fair trade practice, the criteria for application is even lower than that of 
antidumping measures against unfair trade practice. Furthermore, how to interpret the 
requirement of “significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof” is undefined.  
Besides, the phrase “increased imports” in Safeguard Agreement is changed to 
“increasing imports”. Considering the present tense of the phase, it may be understood 
that the imports should keep increasing until the decision of action. Whether it is right, 
we shall wait for determination of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body in the future 
dispute.  
Though there is no specific procedural requirement, the Protocol still indicates 
some factors that need to be considered in the determination, in particular, the effect of 
imports on prices for like or directly competitive articles. To the contrary, as the  
162. Fabio Spadi, Discriminatory Safeguards in the light of the Admission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the World Trade Organization, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Oxford University Press, p. 421-443, 2002. 
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Appellate Body pointed out in the dispute, price is not necessarily relevant to the injury 
test in the normal safeguard case. Reviewing the evolution of the concept of “market 
disruption” under the GATT, STA, LTA and MFA, we can find that the price condition is 
one of the major factors in injury determination, which may explain somewhat the 
importance of price comparison in the injury test of market disruption.163 How will the 
panel and Appellate Body interpret this factor in the context of the transitional product-
specific safeguard mechanism? We shall wait and see. Apart from this, the requirement 
of consideration of factors in the Protocol is much general than that in the Safeguard 
Agreement. For example, the Protocol requires importing Members applying special 
safeguard measure to consider “the effect of such imports on the domestic industry 
producing like or directly competitive products”. Safeguard Agreement disaggregates the 
“effect” into eight specific factors. 
As stated in Part I:16.2 of the Protocol, Members applying transitional product-
specific safeguard measures may push China to take action to prevent or remedy the 
market disruption through consultation. However, it does not state what actions can be 
taken. As there is no reference in the Protocol to the Safeguard Agreement, the action 
may take the form of ERAs, which are strictly prohibited under the Safeguard Agreement. 
Under Part I:12.6 of the Protocol, China is not authorized to suspend equivalent 
concessions if the term of the measure is no longer then two years in case of relative 
increase in imports, whereas no longer than three years in case of absolute increase in 
imports. In addition, provisional safeguard measure is allowed under Part I:12.7, with a 
duration of no more than 200 days. 
It is noteworthy that Part I:12.8 entitles a Member to take safeguard action against  
163. Ibid. 
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trade diversions or threat of the trade diversions into its market, which indirectly result 
from the special safeguard action by another Member or China. This provision put China 
into a very instable and unpredictable trade environment. What’s the definition of “trade 
diversion”? What should be demonstrated to justify the existence of “trade direction”? 
What’s the standard of “trade diversion”? How to measure its level? In fact, the threshold 
to invoke this clause is so low that the possible uncontrolled “falling domino” effect may 
seriously destroy China’s comparative advantage and trade.164 
There is no clause in the Protocol setting forth the term of the special safeguard 
measure. It may be understood that the measure taken under this clause may keep 
effective until 10 December 2013, the expiry date of the transitional product-specific 
safeguard mechanism, provided it is necessary to prevent or remedy the market 
disruption. Similarly, the Protocol does not mention whether a measure can be extended 
or not. 
Finally, why the special safeguard measure is deemed easy to apply is not only 
because its lower threshold, but also because there is no procedural requirement as 
regards notification, consultation, investigation, determination, interim and sunset review, 
surveillance, dispute settlement, and so forth. Moreover, Members need not pay 
compensation for their safeguard actions. Since most of the Members have no domestic 
legislation of safeguard action, they are more likely to arbitrarily impose special 
safeguard action against China. 
In general, the Protocol not only put China in an instable and unpredictable trade 
environment, but also leaves the whole world a lot of uncertainties. Their decision will  
164. Ibid. 
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have great impact on the stability of the world trading system and the development of 
WTO itself.  
 
VII. Suggestions for the Improvement of the Safeguard Agreement 
 
Albeit the Uruguay Round Safeguard Agreement shows a significant 
improvement on the GATT Article XIX, it still has many loopholes as well as 
ambiguities. The Appellate Body in its case law has clarified several equivocal concepts 
and standard. However, some of them remain unclear or unpractical. In this regard, the 
Safeguard Agreement needs to be modified.    
As discussed above, the philosophy of safeguard has its inherent contradictions, 
which also can be seen in the Safeguard Agreement and its dispute settlement practice. 
How to improve the current safeguard mechanism? The answer depends on Members’ 
stance of and the approach used to balance these contradictions. Though the WTO 
dispute settlement practice turned out to vacillating, I think, in the first place, obligations 
under the Safeguard Agreement should be clarified, henceforth consideration can be 
accord to give Members necessary policy flexibility. The most problematic is how to 
measure the level of the legal concepts and standards. 
The first ambiguity needs to be clarified is the relationship between GATT Article 
XIX and the Safeguard Agreement. Albeit the Appellate Body has ruled that GATT 
Article XIX and the Safeguard Agreement apply cumulatively and thereby requested 
factual demonstration of “unforeseen developments”, as discussed above, the ground for 
this ruling is questionable. In fact, this ruling does not clarify anything, but leads to more 
confusion and add more burdens on Members. Moreover, under GATT Article XIX 1(b), 
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a third Member is authorized to impose safeguard measure against increased imports 
from a Member that results from the trade diversion effect due to the safeguard action of 
another Member. There has been no dispute in relation the to third party safeguard action 
to date. According to Appellate Body’s ruling, Article XIX 1(b) shall remain effective. 
The effect of this permission is dangerous and may put the hard-won multilateral 
negotiation results at stake. In sum, the Safeguard Agreement should be the sole 
governing rule of the safeguard measure and the requirement of “unforeseen 
developments” should be declared null and void, as well as Article XIX 1(b). 
Based on the above suggestion, considering that tariff quota is a “less evil” choice 
compared with other quantitative restrictions, the applicability of GATT Article XIII also 
needs to be reconsidered. In my view, it is more economically sound to separate the legal 
binding power of the GATT Article XIX from Safeguard Agreement. 
The situation of domestic industry provides for the factual basis for the 
application of safeguard measures, which determines the accuracy of the measure. To 
improve the accuracy of the determination of the domestic industry situation, first of all, 
the concept of domestic industry needs to be specified. Rather than the equivocal wording 
“major proportion”, a specified standard is needed, like in the countervailing case. 
Secondly, the effects of serious injury and the effects of threat thereof need to be 
distinguished. According to Safeguard Agreement Article 5.1, safeguard measures should 
be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and facilitate 
adjustment. Different level of serious injury causes different effects to the domestic 
industry and thereby entails different remedies in terms of stringency and time limits. 
Without distinction between different levels of injury, it is out of the question to apply the 
measure to the appropriate extent. 
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Albeit for the statement in the text of Safeguard Agreement showing the 
prerequisite of the causal link between increased imports and serious injury, the 
Appellate Body ruled that increased imports does not necessarily be sufficient to cause 
serious injury. This ruling is evidently inconsistent with the Safeguard Agreement. 
Therefore, it needs to be clarified that increased imports alone should be sufficient to 
cause serious injury or threat of serious injury, even though factors other than increased 
imports also contribute to the serious injury or threat thereof at the same time. In addition, 
the practical standard of how to disaggregate the causes should be established. At least, 
the generalized factors like global or domestic economic recession cannot be regarded as 
a single factor. 
Under the Safeguard Agreement, certain selective application of safeguard 
measures is allowed. Article 9 provides for the exemption of developing countries from 
application of safeguard measure by developed countries based on the import share. As 
analyzed, this standard is easily subject to statistical manipulation. To improve it, the de 
minimis criteria shall be based on the domestic market share standard. Besides, whenever 
thinking of the issue of “selectivity”, a question concerning “fairness” arises. Should the 
Members that have a minor influence on the markets be subjective to the safeguard 
measure to prevent the injury caused by those principle suppliers? The question is 
difficult to answer. However, considering the overwhelming use of antidumping 
measures and ERAs in that they can be applied in a discriminatory way,165 as a “less- 
evil” choice, safeguard needs to be encouraged as replacement. To encourage its use, 
165. Even though Safeguard Agreement prohibits the use of ERAs, bilateral ERAs still 
probably occur. It is secret arrangement and discriminatory. Both parties have no 
incentive to complain it. There also less possibility for the third countries to cross 
notify ERAs to the WTO. Therefore, it may still stay beyond the Safeguard 
Agreement. 
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selective application of safeguard targeted at principle suppliers may be necessary. But, 
the rule for selective application should be strict and explicit.  
The Appellate Body ruled that there is no need to provide express justification for 
necessary extent of the measure. It is dubious that the safeguard measure is deemed to be 
applied to the appropriate extent without evidence but mere assertion. To prevent the 
measure from abuse, express justification is needed in my opinion. As to the adjustment 
plan, considering the fact that the political powerful declining industry tend to be 
reluctant to self-adjust, it will be helpful to push forward structural adjustment of the 
domestic industry, which is one of the basic objectives of safeguard. In doing so, the 
standard to evaluate the level of adjustment should be established and the multilateral 
surveillance in this respect should be strengthened. 
As regards the obligation of notification and consultation, the time limits 
permitted for different type of notification should be specified. Since the situation 
deviates case by case, Members may establish maximum standards for several different 
circumstances to encourage timely notification and consultation. As to consultation, the 
standard of the sufficient time and information are needed. However, the Appellate Body 
did not mention how much difference is allowed between measure under consultation and 
measure actually applied. It needs further clarification.  
Safeguard measures take the form of tariff or quantitative restrictions. Usually a 
Member cannot predict which form other Members may take to safeguard domestic 
industry, because it is totally up to Members’ discretion. This situation creates somewhat 
uncertainty. Therefore, also for the sake of the economic efficiency and social welfare, it 
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is plausible to restrain the form of the safeguard measure to tariff, tariff quota and 
auctioned quota. 
Compensation obligation under Safeguard Article 8.1 does not draw much 
attention from the panels and Appellate Body. However, the issue of compensation is of 
great significance in the safeguard system. It is one of the major reasons preventing 
Members from abusing safeguard mechanism. Situation has been different since the 
Uruguay Round. The average tariff level of Members has been significantly reduced. 
Therefore, there is not much room for Members to provide compensation. In the future, 
this problem will become more prominent with the development of trade liberalization. 
Hence, the compensation requirement needs to be relaxed. Actually, it has been 
somewhat relaxed in the Safeguard Agreement, but not so much. 
As to the procedural problem of the dispute settlement concerning safeguard 
measures, suggestion is provided to establish a fast-track dispute settlement procedure, 
with a view to accelerating the proceedings. 
Finally, regarding the future dispute in relation to the transitional product-specific 
safeguard measure against the imports from China, especially the special safeguard action 
taken under the trade diversion effect, the WTO panel and Appellate Body should 
interpret the clause very prudentially, objectively and strictly. Any loose interpretation of 
the Protocol may result with an uncontrollable disaster to both China and the world 
trading system; thereby dismantle the results of the multilateral trade liberalization. 
Members are also called upon to be prudential in application. Arbitrarily application of 
safeguard measure may be the source of the turbulence. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
Members shall always bear in mind that safeguard is extraordinary trade remedy 
under emergent situations against fair trade practice. It is regarded as a measure of last 
resort. As a major trade remedy under the WTO, its fundamental objective is to promote 
trade liberalization. It also serves the goal of facilitating adjustment.  
Even though the Safeguard Agreement is an achievement of Uruguay Round 
multilateral trade negotiation and shows great improvement on the GATT Article XIX, 
there are still many uncertainties and undefined criteria, which have caused difficulties in 
application and vagueness in rule interpretation. The dichotomy nature of safeguard also 
made the Appellate Body struggle during the dispute settlement proceeding. Its view on 
some issue deviated from case to case. In its case law, the Appellate Body provided many 
resolutions to legal and factual issues in interpretation of the rules and application of the 
measures. However, some ambiguities remain unresolved, some of their decision even 
made the ambiguities more serious. Those ambiguities need to be addressed to improve 
the clarity of the rule and the certainty of the safeguard system. The suggestion provided 
should be considered to further improve the safeguard system and therefore enhance the 
integrity of the multilateral trading system.  
Concerning the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism targeted at 
China, the panel and Appellate Body are called upon to be prudential, objective and strict 
in their findings both of law and facts.  
Taking into consideration of the fact that all the disputes in relation to safeguard 
measures before the DSB resulted in inconsistency with the Safeguard Agreement, 
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Members shall pay more attention to comply with the multilateral rule. In addition, the 
multilateral surveillance should be strengthened. 
In conclusion, though the current safeguard mechanism shows significant 
improvement not only in its operation system but also in the respect of increasing 
invocation by the Members, due to the problems discussed above, it is likely to continue 
to play a minor role in the multilateral trading system. However, the transitional product-
specific safeguard mechanism against China may be an exception. Whether it can help 
China to be incorporated into the world trade system or bring the world into turmoil, we 
have to wait and see. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Article XIX: Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 
 
1.  (a)  If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by 
a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being 
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or 
directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to 
the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the 
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. 
 
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being 
imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) 
of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such 
preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, 
to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in 
respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
such injury. 
 
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be 
practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a 
substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the 
proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the 
notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where 
delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article 
may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected 
immediately after taking such action.  
 
3.  (a)  If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not 
reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be 
free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be 
free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty 
days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case 
envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such 
action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the 
suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.  
 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is 
taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious 
injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the 
action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to 
suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions 
or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS 
 
Members, 
 
 Having in mind the overall objective of the Members to improve and strengthen the international 
trading system based on GATT 1994; 
 
 Recognizing the need to clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994, and specifically those 
of its Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products), to re-establish multilateral control 
over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape such control; 
 
 Recognizing the importance of structural adjustment and the need to enhance rather than limit 
competition in international markets;  and 
 
 Recognizing further that, for these purposes, a comprehensive agreement, applicable to all 
Members and based on the basic principles of GATT 1994, is called for; 
 
 Hereby agree as follows: 
 
Article 1  
 
General Provision 
 
  This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be 
understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994. 
 
 
Article 2 
 
Conditions 
 
1. A Member1 may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined, 
pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory in such 
increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause  or 
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products. 
 
2. Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its source. 
 
 
Article 3 
 
Investigation 
 
                                                 
1 A customs union may apply a safeguard measure as a single unit or on behalf of a member State.  When a customs 
union applies a safeguard measure as a single unit, all the requirements for the determination of serious injury or threat 
thereof under this Agreement shall be based on the conditions existing in the customs union as a whole.  When a 
safeguard measure is applied on behalf of a member State,  all the requirements for the determination of serious injury 
or threat thereof shall be based on the conditions existing in that member State and the measure shall be limited to that 
member State.  Nothing in this Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the relationship between Article XIX and 
paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. 
 - 96 - 
1. A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent 
authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made public in consonance 
with Article X of GATT 1994.  This investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested 
parties and public hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested 
parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of 
other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard 
measure would be in the public interest.  The competent authorities shall publish a report setting forth their 
findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law. 
 
2. Any information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall, 
upon cause being shown, be treated as such by the competent authorities.  Such information shall not be 
disclosed without permission of the party submitting it.  Parties providing confidential information may be 
requested to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof or, if such parties indicate that such information 
cannot be summarized, the reasons why a summary cannot be provided.  However, if the competent 
authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the party concerned is either 
unwilling to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the 
authorities may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to their satisfaction from 
appropriate sources that the information is correct. 
 
 
Article 4 
 
 Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof 
 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
 
(a) "serious injury" shall be understood to mean a significant overall impairment in the 
position of a domestic industry; 
 
(b) "threat of serious injury" shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly 
imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.  A determination of the 
existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, 
conjecture or remote possibility;  and 
 
(c) in determining injury or threat thereof, a "domestic industry" shall be understood to mean 
the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products operating within the 
territory of a Member, or those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive 
products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products. 
 
2. (a) In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are  
threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this 
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective  
and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the 
rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and 
relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in 
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits  and losses, and 
employment. 
 
 (b) The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made unless this 
investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal 
link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat 
thereof.  When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic 
industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. 
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 (c) The competent authorities shall publish promptly, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 3, a detailed analysis of the case under investigation as well as a 
demonstration of the relevance of the factors examined. 
 
 
Article 5 
 
Application of Safeguard Measures 
 
1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy 
serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.  If a quantitative restriction is used, such a measure shall  not 
reduce the quantity of imports below the level of a recent period which shall be the average of imports in 
the last three representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a 
different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.  Members should choose measures most 
suitable for the achievement of these objectives. 
 
2. (a) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the Member 
applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in 
the quota with all other Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product 
concerned.  In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the Member 
concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product 
shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous 
representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account 
being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade 
in the product. 
 
 (b) A Member may depart from the provisions in subparagraph (a) provided that 
consultations under paragraph 3 of Article 12 are conducted under the auspices of the 
Committee on Safeguards provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 13 and that clear 
demonstration is provided to the Committee that (i) imports from certain Members have 
increased in disproportionate percentage in relation to the total increase of imports of the 
product  concerned in the representative period, (ii) the reasons for the departure from the 
provisions in subparagraph (a) are justified, and (iii) the conditions of such departure are 
equitable to all suppliers of the product concerned.  The duration of any such measure 
shall not be extended beyond the initial period under paragraph 1 of Article 7.  The 
departure referred to above shall not be permitted in the case of threat of serious injury. 
 
 
Article 6 
 
Provisional Safeguard Measures  
 
 In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, a 
Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is 
clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury.  The duration 
of the provisional measure shall not exceed 200 days, during which period the pertinent requirements of 
Articles 2 through 7 and 12 shall be met.  Such measures should take the form of tariff increases to be 
promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 does not determine 
that increased imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.  The 
duration of any such provisional measure shall be counted as a part of the initial period and any extension 
referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 7. 
 
 
Article 7 
 
Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures 
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1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.  The period shall not exceed four years, 
unless it is extended under paragraph 2. 
 
2. The period mentioned in paragraph 1 may be extended provided that the competent authorities of 
the importing Member have determined, in conformity with the procedures set out in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, 
that  the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and  that there is 
evidence that the industry is adjusting, and provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8 and 12 are 
observed. 
 
3. The total period of application of a safeguard measure including the period of application of any 
provisional measure, the period of initial application and any extension thereof, shall not exceed eight years. 
 
4. In order to facilitate adjustment in a situation where the expected duration of a safeguard measure 
as notified under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 12 is over one year, the Member applying the 
measure shall progressively liberalize it at regular intervals during the period of application.  If the duration 
of the measure exceeds three years, the Member applying such a measure shall review the situation not 
later than the mid-term of the measure and, if appropriate, withdraw it or increase the pace of liberalization.  
A measure extended under paragraph 2 shall not be more restrictive than it was at the end of the initial 
period, and should continue to be liberalized. 
 
5. No safeguard measure shall be applied again to the import of a product which has been subject to 
such a measure, taken after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, for a period of time equal 
to that during which such measure had been previously applied, provided that the period of non-application 
is at least two years. 
 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, a safeguard measure with a duration of 180 days 
or less may be applied again to the import of a product if: 
 
(a) at least one year has elapsed since the date of introduction of a safeguard measure on the 
import of that product;  and 
 
(b) such a safeguard measure has not been applied on the same product more than twice in 
the five-year period immediately preceding the date of introduction of the measure. 
 
 
Article 8 
 
Level of Concessions and Other Obligations 
 
1. A Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an extension of a safeguard 
measure shall endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to 
that existing under GATT 1994 between it and the exporting Members which would be affected by such a 
measure, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 12.  To achieve this  objective, the 
Members concerned may agree on any adequate means of trade compensation for the adverse effects of the 
measure on their trade. 
 
2. If no agreement is reached within 30 days in the consultations under paragraph 3 of Article 12, 
then the affected exporting Members shall be free, not later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to 
suspend, upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is 
received by the Council for Trade in Goods, the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other 
obligations under GATT 1994, to the trade of the Member applying the safeguard measure, the suspension 
of which the Council for Trade in Goods does not disapprove. 
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3. The right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be exercised for the first three years 
that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an 
absolute increase in imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
 
Article 9 
 
Developing Country Members 
 
1. Safeguard measures shall not be applied against a product originating in a developing country 
Member as long as its share of imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does not exceed 
3 per cent, provided that developing country Members with less than 3 per cent import share  collectively 
account for not more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned.2 
 
2.  A developing country Member shall have the right to extend the period of application of a 
safeguard measure for a period of up to two years beyond the maximum period provided for in paragraph 3 
of Article 7.  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 7, a developing  country Member 
shall have the right to apply a safeguard measure again to the import of a product which has been subject to 
such a measure, taken after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, after a period of time equal 
to half that during which such a measure has been previously applied, provided that the period of 
non-application is at least two years. 
 
 
Article 10 
 
Pre-existing Article XIX Measures 
 
 Members shall terminate all safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1947 that 
were in existence on the date of entry into force of the WTO  Agreement not later than eight years after the 
date on which they were first applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
whichever comes later. 
 
 
Article 11 
 
Prohibition and Elimination of Certain Measures 
 
1. (a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular 
products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994 unless such action conforms with the 
provisions of that Article applied in accordance with this Agreement.   
 
 (b) Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export 
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or 
the import side.3,4  These include actions taken by a single Member as well as actions 
under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two or more 
Members.  Any such measure in effect on the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or phased out in 
accordance with paragraph 2. 
 
                                                 
2 A Member shall immediately notify an action taken under paragraph 1 of Article 9 to the Committee on Safeguards. 
3 An import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and this 
Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered by the exporting Member. 
4 Examples of similar measures include export moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring systems, export or 
import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which 
afford protection. 
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 (c) This Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a 
Member pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, and Multilateral 
Trade Agreements in Annex 1A other than this Agreement, or pursuant to protocols and 
agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of GATT 1994. 
 
2. The phasing out of measures referred to in paragraph 1(b) shall be carried out according to  
timetables to be presented to the Committee on Safeguards by the Members concerned not later than 
180 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  These timetables shall provide for all 
measures referred to in paragraph 1 to be phased out or brought into conformity with this Agreement within 
a period not exceeding four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to not 
more than one specific measure per importing Member5, the duration of which shall not extend beyond 
31 December 1999.  Any such exception must be mutually agreed between the Members directly concerned 
and notified to the Committee on Safeguards for its review and acceptance within 90 days of the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement.  The Annex to this Agreement indicates a measure which has been agreed as 
falling under this exception. 
 
3. Members shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance by public and private 
enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1. 
 
 
Article 12 
 
Notification and Consultation 
 
1. A Member shall immediately notify the Committee on Safeguards upon: 
 
(a) initiating an investigatory process relating to serious injury or threat thereof and the 
reasons for it; 
 
(b) making a finding of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased imports;  and 
 
(c) taking a decision to apply or extend a safeguard measure. 
 
2. In making the notifications referred to in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c), the Member proposing to apply 
or extend a safeguard measure shall provide the Committee on Safeguards with all pertinent information, 
which shall include evidence of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased imports, precise 
description of the product involved and the proposed measure, proposed date of introduction, expected 
duration and timetable for progressive liberalization.  In the case of an extension of a measure,  evidence 
that the industry concerned is adjusting shall also be provided.  The Council for Trade in Goods or the 
Committee on Safeguards may request such additional information as they may consider necessary from 
the Member proposing to apply or extend the measure. 
 
3. A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate opportunity 
for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product 
concerned, with a view to,  inter alia, reviewing the information provided under paragraph 2, exchanging 
views on the measure and reaching an understanding on ways to achieve the objective set out in 
paragraph 1 of Article 8. 
 
4. A Member shall make a notification to the Committee on Safeguards before taking a provisional 
safeguard measure referred to in Article 6.  Consultations shall be initiated immediately after the measure is 
taken. 
 
5. The results of the consultations referred to in this Article, as well as the results of mid-term 
reviews referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 7, any form of compensation referred to in paragraph 1 of 
                                                 
5 The only such exception to which the European Communities is entitled is indicated in the Annex to this Agreement. 
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Article 8, and proposed suspensions of concessions and other obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of 
Article 8, shall be notified immediately to the Council for Trade in Goods by the Members concerned. 
 
6. Members shall notify promptly the Committee on Safeguards of their laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures as well as any modifications made to them. 
 
7. Members maintaining measures described in Article 10 and paragraph 1 of Article 11 which exist 
on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement  shall notify such measures to the Committee on 
Safeguards not later than 60 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
8. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards of all laws, regulations, administrative 
procedures and any measures or actions dealt with in this Agreement that have not been notified by other 
Members that are required by this Agreement to make such notifications. 
 
9. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards of any non-governmental measures 
referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 11. 
 
10. All notifications to the Council for Trade in Goods referred to in this Agreement shall normally be 
made through the Committee on Safeguards. 
 
11. The provisions on notification in this Agreement shall not require any Member to disclose 
confidential information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary 
to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public 
or private. 
 
 
Article 13 
 
Surveillance 
 
1. A Committee on Safeguards is hereby established, under the authority of the Council for Trade in 
Goods, which shall be open to the participation of any Member indicating its wish to serve on it.  The 
Committee will have the following functions: 
 
(a) to monitor, and report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods on, the general 
implementation of this Agreement and make recommendations towards its improvement; 
 
(b) to find, upon request of an affected Member, whether or not the procedural requirements 
of this Agreement have been complied with in connection with a safeguard measure, and 
report its findings to the Council for Trade in Goods; 
 
(c) to assist Members, if they so request, in their consultations under the provisions of this 
Agreement; 
 
(d) to examine measures covered by Article 10 and paragraph 1 of Article 11, monitor  the 
phase-out of such measures and report as appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods; 
 
(e) to review, at the request of the Member taking a safeguard measure, whether proposals to 
suspend concessions or other obligations are "substantially equivalent", and report as 
appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods; 
 
(f) to receive and review all notifications provided for in this Agreement and report as 
appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods;  and 
 
(g) to perform any other function connected with this Agreement that the Council for Trade 
in Goods may determine. 
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2. To assist the Committee in carrying out its surveillance function, the Secretariat shall prepare 
annually a factual report on the operation of this Agreement based on notifications and other reliable 
information available to it. 
 
Article 14 
 
Dispute Settlement 
 
 
 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes arising under 
this Agreement. 
 
 
ANNEX 
 
EXCEPTION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 11 
 
Members concerned Product Termination 
EC/Japan Passenger cars, off road vehicles, 
light commercial vehicles, light 
trucks (up to 5 tonnes), and the 
same vehicles in wholly 
knocked-down form (CKD sets). 
31 December 1999 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
Article XIII*: Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions 
 
1.  No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of any 
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or 
the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted. 
 
2.  In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of 
trade in such products approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties 
might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the following 
provisions: 
 
(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports (whether 
allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given of their amount 
in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article; 
 
(b) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means of 
import licences or permits without a quota;  
 
 
(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in accordance 
with sub-paragraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or permits be utilized 
for the importation of the product concerned from a particular country or source;  
 
(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting party 
applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the 
quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product 
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concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party 
concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the 
product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during a 
previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due 
account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the 
trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any 
contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has 
been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which 
the quota may relate.* 
 
3.  (a)  In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions, the 
contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any contracting party 
having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant information concerning the 
administration of the restrictions, the import licences granted over a recent period and the 
distribution of such licences among supplying countries; Provided that there shall be no obligation 
to supply information as to the names of importing or supplying enterprises.  
 
(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party 
applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product or 
products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any 
change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in question which were en route at 
the time at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided that they 
may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in 
question, and also, where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported in the next 
following period or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting party customarily 
exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse 
for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of such public notice, such practice 
shall be considered full compliance with this sub-paragraph. 
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(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party applying 
the restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an interest in supplying 
the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the 
various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof.  
 
4.  With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under 
paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of 
any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the contracting party 
applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting party shall, upon the request of any other 
contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the other contracting party or the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, 
or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any 
other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its unrestricted 
utilization. 
 
5.  The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export 
restrictions. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China 
 
…… 
 
Part I - General Provisions 
 
…… 
 
16. Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism 
 
1. In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the territory of any 
WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or threaten to 
cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, the 
WTO Member so affected may request consultations with China with a view to seeking a 
mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the affected WTO Member should pursue 
application of a measure under the Agreement on Safeguards.  Any such request shall be notified 
immediately to the Committee on Safeguards. 
 
2. If, in the course of these bilateral consultations, it is agreed that imports of Chinese origin are such 
a cause and that action is necessary, China shall take such action as to prevent or remedy the market 
disruption.  Any such action shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards. 
 
3. If consultations do not lead to an agreement between China and the WTO Member concerned 
within 60 days of the receipt of a request for consultations, the WTO Member affected shall be free, in 
respect of such products, to withdraw concessions or otherwise to limit imports only to the extent necessary 
to prevent or remedy such market disruption.  Any such action shall be notified immediately to the 
Committee on Safeguards. 
 
4. Market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an 
article produced by the domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be 
a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the domestic industry.  In determining if 
market disruption exists, the affected WTO Member shall consider objective factors, including the volume 
of imports, the effect of imports on prices for like or directly competitive articles, and the effect of such 
imports on the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. 
 
5. Prior to application of a measure pursuant to paragraph 3, the WTO Member taking such action 
shall provide reasonable public notice to all interested parties and provide adequate opportunity for 
importers, exporters and other interested parties to submit their views and evidence on the appropriateness 
of the proposed measure and whether it would be in the public interest.  The WTO Member shall provide 
written notice of the decision to apply a measure, including the reasons for such measure and its scope and 
duration. 
 
6. A WTO Member shall apply a measure pursuant to this Section only for such period of time as 
may be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption.  If a measure is taken as a result of a relative 
increase in the level of imports, China has the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent 
concessions or obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO Member applying the measure, if 
such measure remains in effect more than two years.  However, if a measure is taken as a result of an 
absolute increase in imports, China has a right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent 
concessions or obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO Member applying the measure, if 
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such measure remains in effect more than three years.  Any such action by China shall be notified 
immediately to the Committee on Safeguards. 
 
7. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, 
the WTO Member so affected may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary 
determination that imports have caused or threatened to cause market disruption.  In this case, notification 
of the measures taken to the Committee on Safeguards and a request for bilateral consultations shall be 
effected immediately thereafter.  The duration of the provisional measure shall not exceed 200 days during 
which the pertinent requirements of paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 shall be met.  The duration of any provisional 
measure shall be counted toward the period provided for under paragraph 6. 
 
8. If a WTO Member considers that an action taken under paragraphs 2, 3 or 7 causes or threatens to 
cause significant diversions of trade into its market, it may request consultations with China and/or the 
WTO Member concerned.  Such consultations shall be held within 30 days after the request is notified to 
the Committee on Safeguards.  If such consultations fail to lead to an agreement between China and the 
WTO Member or Members concerned within 60 days after the notification, the requesting WTO Member 
shall be free, in respect of such product, to withdraw concessions accorded to or otherwise limit imports 
from China, to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such diversions.  Such action shall be notified 
immediately to the Committee on Safeguards. 
 
9. Application of this Section shall be terminated 12 years after the date of accession. 
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